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I. Introduction
The mountains of El Salvador used to harbor and protect the
small village of El Mozote. At one time El Mozote used to be a
place where men, women, and children lived together peacefully
while working hard to sustain their reasonable quality of life.
However, on December 11, 1980, during the El Salvador civil war,
the peace and tranquility of this small village was shattered. After
engaging in a conflict with guerrillas in the vicinity, the Atlacatl
Battalion, a battalion of the El Salvador Army, entered the village.1
After spending the night in the village, the soldiers of the Atlacatl
Battalion forced the villagers out of their homes, and proceeded to
torture, interrogate, and execute the men.2 After eliminating the
adult males of the village, the soldiers then separated the women
from the children. The soldiers then systematically executed the
women before slaughtering the children.! Rufina Amaya, a woman
who survived the El Mozote siege, has described the events:
There were soldiers on both sides. Then they moved away to
see the women kneeling down on the ground to pray. They
killed all of them. Not a single one of them survived. Just me,
by the grace of God. I hid under a tree. When I heard the
* This comment, written by Timothy J. Kepner, received the 2001 Richard
Reeve Baxter Award. This award is given in recognition of excellence in
scholarship and legal writing in the field of international law.
1. See SCHOOL OF THE AMERICAS: SCHOOL OF ASSASSINS (Richter
Productions 1994); U.N. Truth Commission Report on El Mozote, at
http://www.parascope.com/articles/0197/el-moz05.htm (last visited Jan. 9, 2001).
2. See U.N. Truth Commission Report on El Mozote, at http://www
.parascope.com/articles/0197/elmoz05.htm (last visited Jan. 9, 2001).
3. See id.
4. See id.
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screams of the children, and I knew which ones were mine, they
were crying 'Mommy, they are killing us.'5
In the end, the soldiers of the Atlacatl Battalion burned the village
to the ground and massacred more than 900 men, women, and
children.6 Out of 143 bodies later identified in a lab following the
massacre, 131 were children under the age of twelve, including
three infants under the age of three months.7
When horrific and terrible human rights abuses have occurred,
such as the El Mozote massacre, the question of responsibility
weighs on every person's mind. In regards to the deaths of the
innocent men, women, and children at El Mozote, the most obvious
parties responsible are the Atlacatl Battalion and the El Salvador
Army. However, if the world were to hold only these two parties
responsible for the El Mozote massacre, responsibility would not be
truly assessed because in the shadows of El Mozote there lurks
another responsible party with blood on its hands-the United
States of America.
After an investigation into the El Mozote massacre, twelve
soldiers were cited for the massacre.8 Of these twelve soldiers, ten
were graduates of the School of the Americas. 9 The School of the
Americas ("SOA") is a training facility financed and operated by
the United States with the mission of training Latin American
soldiers."0  However, the SOA has also received infamous
recognition for the great number of SOA graduates who have
committed human right abuses." Besides the El Mozote massacre,
SOA graduates have played key roles in nearly every coup and
major human rights violation in Latin America in the past fifty
years. 2 In fact, Latin American nations with the worst human
rights records have consistently sent the most soldiers to the SOA. 3
Martin Meehand, a Congressman from Massachusetts, has noted
"[i]f the SOA held an alumni association meeting, it would bring
5. SCHOOL OF THE AMERICAS: SCHOOL OF ASSASSINS, supra note 1.
6. See id; U.N. Truth Commission Report on El Mozote, at http://www
.parascope.com/ articles/0197/elmoz05.htm (last visited Jan. 9, 2001).
7. See SCHOOL OF THE AMERICAS: SCHOOL OF ASSASSINS, supra note 1.
8. See id.
9. See id.
10. See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, School of the Americas: U.S. Military
Training for Latin American Countries, GAO/NSIAD-96-178, 20, August 1996.
11. See JACK NELSON-PALLMEYER, SCHOOL OF ASSASSINS: THE CASE FOR
CLOSING THE SCHOOL OF THE AMERICAS AND FOR FUNDAMENTALLY CHANGING
U.S. FOREIGN POLICY 9 (1997).
12. See id.
13. See Brian Brown, School for Scandal, COMMONWEAL, Dec. 18, 1998, at 10.
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together some of the most unsavory thugs in the hemisphere."1
There have been so many despots trained at the SOA that it has
earned numerous nicknames including "School of Coups," "School
of Assassins," and "School of Dictators.""
The United States government and other defenders of the
SOA have argued that the SOA cannot be blamed for a "few bad
apples" who commit human rights abuses. 6 The problem with this
argument is the fact that the SOA curriculum has not only been
weak in teaching a respect for human rights, but has, in fact,
encouraged Latin American soldiers to torture and use other
techniques that are considered violations of international law. The
United States can no longer deny its responsibility and liability for
the tortures, assassinations, massacres, and murders committed by
the soldiers that it has trained.
The purpose of this Comment is to discuss the United States'
liability in domestic courts for the human rights abuses committed
by soldiers who received training from the SOA using the
perspective of a hypothetical alien plaintiff. First, Part II of this
Comment will discuss the background of the SOA, the legacy of
some of its graduates, and the evidence that torture and disrespect
for human rights are part of the SOA curriculum. Part III will then
explore the legal complications the hypothetical plaintiff would face
trying to establish and maintain jurisdiction in a Federal District
Court when suing the United States under the Alien Tort Act and
the Federal Tort Claims Act. Part IV will analyze the United
States' liability for teaching torture and improper human rights
training using reasoning and analysis from civil rights jurisprudence.
Finally, this Comment will conclude with a brief discussion about
Congress "shutting down" the SOA.
II. The School of the Americas
After World War II, the fear of communism became the
driving force behind United States foreign policy.7 According to
George Kennan, the former head of the State Department's
planning staff, the goal of United States foreign policy after World
War II was not democracy, freedom, development, or human
rights.'8 Instead, regional stability became the goal of United States
14. Id.
15. NELSON-PALLMEYER, supra note 11, at 41.
16. Id. at 18-19.
17. See NELSON-PALLMEYER, supra note 11, at 56-57.
18. See id. at 39.
478 DICKINSON JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 19:3
foreign policy, especially in Third World areas where the United
States had "vital interests"'9 and where social conditions such as
hunger, poverty, and inequality were feeding impulses for social
change." In order to protect its vital interests and maintain regional
stability, the United States supported repressive militaries and
governments through its considerable ideological and financial
weight.2 However, in Latin America, the United States' support
was not limited solely to financing governments and militaries, but
also included the training of Latin American soldiers and officers
by United States personnel.22 These trained soldiers were to
become the instruments of foreign policy in Latin America.23
A. History and Background of the School of the Americas
In 1946, the United States established a training institution in
the Panama Canal Zone.24 The original purpose of this institution
was to provide training to United States Army personnel in
garrison technical skills such as food preparation, maintenance, and
other support functions. 5 But soon the institution's goal became
the promotion of stability throughout the Latin American region.26
In 1963, the institution officially became the School of the Americas
and Spanish was declared the School's official language.27 In 1984,
the SOA moved to its current location at Fort Benning, Georgia, in
order to comply with the terms of the 1977 Panama Canal Treaty
and because of a conflict between the United States and
Panamanian officials regarding the operation and command of the
SOA.2 Then in 1987, under 10 U.S.C. §4415, Congress formally
authorized the Secretary of the Army to operate the SOA with the
objective of providing military education and training to military
personnel of Latin American and Caribbean countries.29
19. "Vital interests" is a euphemism for United States corporate investments.
See id. at 39.
20. See NELSON-PALLMEYER, supra note 11, at 39, 40.
21. See id. at 40.
22. See id.
23. See id.
24. See SCHOOL OF THE AMERICAS: SCHOOL OF ASSASSINS, supra note 1.
25. See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 10, at 20.
26. See NELSON-PALLMEYER, supra note 11, at 40.
27. See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 10, at 20.
28. See id.; NELSON-PALLMEYER, supra note 11, at 2.
29. See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 10, at 20. Title 10, Section
4415 of the United States Code, entitled "United States Army School of the
Americas," provides:
(a) The Secretary of the Army operate the military education and training
facility known as the United States Army School of the Americas.
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Since the SOA opened, 55,000 military officials and 4,000
policemen and civilians from over twenty-three different countries
have trained at the school.3° Half the students who attend the SOA
come from five primary countries-Colombia, El Salvador,
Nicaragua, Peru, and Panama." Even though the United States
Army offers training of foreign soldiers at other locations, the SOA
trains most of the Latin American military students who come to
the United States because the courses are primarily taught in
Spanish. 2 Candidates for the school are selected by foreign military
officials and then approved by the United States embassies in Latin
America.33 Both United States and Latin American military
personnel teach courses at the SOA, with civilians teaching some of
classes.34 According to the Pentagon, "the mission of the school is
to train the armed forces of Latin America, promote military
professionalism, foster cooperation among multi-national military
forces, and to expand trainees' knowledge of United States customs
and traditions."35  The United States considers training and
educating Latin American militaries as a critical and long-term
investment in its national security strategy of promoting democracy
in Latin America.36
The United States' taxpayers primarily fund the SOA.37 In
1995, the SOA received $2.6 million from the Army's operation and
maintenance account and a total of $18.4 million were spent on the
School's operation costs. In the early 1990's, a total of $30 million
(b) The School of the Americas shall be operated for the purpose of
providing military education and training to military personnel of
Central and South American countries and Caribbean countries.
(c) The fixed costs of operating and maintaining the School of the
Americas may be paid from funds available for operation and
maintenance of the Army.
(d) Tuition fees charged for personnel receiving military education and
training from the school may not include the fixed costs of operating
and maintaining the school.
30. See SCHOOL OF THE AMERICAS: SCHOOL OF ASSASSINS, supra note 1;
NELSON-PALLMEYER, supra note 11, at 2.
31. Brian Brown, School for Scandal, COMMONWEAL, Dec. 18, 1998, at 10.
32. See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 10, at 2. Other institutions
where the United States offers training to Latin American soldiers are the Naval
Small Craft and Technical Training School in Panama and the Inter-American Air
Force Academy located at the Lackland Air Force Base in Texas. See id. at 6, n.5.
33. See id. at 7.
34. See id. at 3.
35. SCHOOL OF THE AMERICAS: SCHOOL OF ASSASSINS, supra note 1.
36. See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 10, at 1, 6.
37. See id. at 2.
38. See id. at 2, 35.
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was used to renovate the buildings and dorms of the school.39
Besides direct funding from taxpayers, the SOA also receives
indirect funding from taxpayers through foreign militaries using
United States security assistance grants.'
The core curriculum at the school centers on commando and
combat courses.41 Specifically, SOA courses include: commando
operations, sniper training, countermine training, defense resource
management, weapons training, infantry tactics, tactical intelli-
gence, patrolling, battle planning, civil-military relations, and
psychological warfare.42 Since 1990, the curriculum at the school
has expanded to include addressing post-Cold War needs of the
Latin America region.43 The school's curriculum is based on United
States military doctrine and practices, and the materials used are
identical to the materials presented to United States military
personnel."
The Army and the United States have claimed "[i]t is a
requirement of the School that every course, regardless of subject
or length, include formal instruction emphasizing the sanctity of
human rights and proper role of the military in a democratic
society. 4 ' However, benevolent statements like this can only be
accurately evaluated by discussing a handful of SOA graduates.
B. Graduates of the School and Their Legacy
In 1995, the State Department reported that, even though
progress has been made, abuses of human rights continue to be
widespread in some Latin American countries. 6  The horrible
reality surrounding the widespread existence of human rights
abuses is the fact that graduates from the SOA have played key
39. See SCHOOL OF THE AMERICAS: SCHOOL OF ASSASSINS, supra note 1.
40. See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 10, at 2. The United
States provides money to foreign countries to allow these foreign countries to
purchase military training from the United States through three foreign assistance
programs -Foreign Military Financing, International Narcotics and Law
Enforcement, and International Military Education and Training. See id. at 6, n.4.
41. See School of the Americas Watch, Congress Closes U.S. Army School of
the Americas, Gives Okay to Open Clone, at http://www.soaw.orglleg.html (last
visited Sept. 26, 2000).
42. See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 10, at 2; SCHOOL OF THE
AMERICAS: SCHOOL OF ASSASSINS, supra note 1.
43. See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 10, at 2.
44. See id. at 12.
45. NELSON-PALLMEYER, supra note 11, at 21.
46. See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 10, at 4.
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roles in some of the worst human rights abuses in El Salvador,
Colombia, Guatemala, and other countries.
1. El Salvador-In 1980, a civil war in El Salvador became a
focal point for human rights advocates .0 This war found the
citizens of El Salvador threatened by unrestrained death squads
that killed up to fifty people a night.48 On March 23, 1980,
Archbishop Oscar Romero made a plea to the leaders of El
Salvador:
I would like to make an appeal in a special way to the men of
the Army in the name of God and the name of the suffering
people whose laments rise to the heavens each day more
tumultuous. I beg you, I ask you, I order you in the name of
- 49God. Stop the repression.
The next day, Archbishop Romero was assassinated.' A number of
years after the assassination, the National Security Archives in
Washington, D.C. obtained a copy of a declassified cable from the
American Embassy in El Salvador." The cable discussed a meeting
during which Roberto D'Aubuisson planned the murder of
Archbishop Romero, and held a lottery to select the actual killer.
D'Aubuisson and two of the three officers directly responsible for
Archbishop Romero's death were all graduates of the SOA.53
On November 16, 1989, six Jesuit priests, their housekeeper,
and her fifteen-year-old daughter were murdered in San Salvador. 4
The Jesuits were murdered because they were considered
"intellectual leaders" of Communist aggression." A United States
Congressional investigation, headed by Representative Joseph
Moakley, began to look into these murders.56 The investigation
found that the Atlacatl Battalion committed the murders after
some of the members of the Battalion returned from the United
States where they received training in a number of areas, including
human rights. 7 The investigation concluded that nineteen of the
47. See SCHOOL OF THE AMERICAS: SCHOOL OF ASSASSINS, supra note 1.
48. See id.
49. Id.
50. See id.
51. See id.
52. See SCHOOL OF THE AMERICAS: SCHOOL OF ASSASSINS, supra note 1.
53. See id.
54. See id.
55. School of the Americas: Closing Time, AMERICA, Nov. 28, 1998, at 3.
56. See SCHOOL OF THE AMERICAS: SCHOOL OF ASSASSINS, supra note 1.
57. See id. As discussed previously, the members of the Atlacatl Battalion
were also responsible for the El Mozote Massacre. See supra notes 1-7 and
accompanying text.
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twenty-six officers implicated in the murders, including the
lieutenant in charge of the squad, were graduates of the SOA .
Additionally, General Juan Rafael Bustillo, former air force chief
of El Salvador and graduate of the SOA, helped to plan and cover
up the Jesuit massacres.59
The United Nations created a Truth Commission to specifically
investigate the human rights atrocities committed during the El
Salvador civil war.' ° The United Nations Truth Commission report
held that the El Salvador military and other United States backed
governments were responsible for the vast majority of human rights
violations, massacres, and civilian deaths.6 The Truth Commission
further listed the names of specific officers responsible for atrocities
during the El Salvador war, and this list was cross-referenced with a
list of graduates from the SOA.62 More than two-thirds of the sixty
officers cited in the Truth Commission Report were alumni of the
SOA. 63 Apart from the soldiers and officers already discussed, the
report also noted a number of other SOA graduates involved in
human rights abuses. These graduates include: three officers cited
for the rape and murder of four nuns buried in an unmarked grave;
three officers cited for the murder of two union leaders; two officers
cited for the El Junquillo Massacre; three officers cited for the Las
Hojas Massacre; and six officers cited for the Sebastian Massacre. 6 4
2. Colombia-More than 100 of the 246 Colombian officers
cited for war crimes by an international tribunal in 1993 were
graduates from the SOA, including Colombia's Lieutenant Colonel
Victor Bernal Castano.65 In 1992, Lieutenant Colonel Bernal
Castano was allowed to attend the SOA in order to escape a
criminal investigation of his role in the massacre of a peasant
family.66 Furthermore, Human Rights Watch, an international
human rights watchdog group, compiled a report discussing the link
between the Colombian government and Colombian military and
5& See id. One of the Atlacatl lieutenants during the killings was Jose
Ricardo Espinoza Guerra. Guerra had been a Jesuit alumnus who had once been
a student of one of his victims. See School of the Americas: Closing Time,
AMERICA, Nov. 28, 1998, at 3.
59. See NELSON-PALLMEYER, supra note 11, at 33.
60. See SCHOOL OF THE AMERICAS: SCHOOL OF ASSASSINS, supra note 1.
61. See NELSON-PALLMEYER, supra note 11, at 6.
62. See SCHOOL OF THE AMERICAS: SCHOOL OF ASSASSINS, supra note 1.
63. See Cesar Chelala, School of the Americas Accused of Training Human-
Rights Abusers, LANCET, Nov. 22, 1997, at 1530.
64. See NELSON-PALLMEYER, supra note 11, at 7; SCHOOL OF THE AMERICAS:
SCHOOL OF ASSASSINS, supra note 1.
65. See NELSON-PALLMEYER, supra note 11, at 9.
66. See id.
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paramilitary groups, groups who were deemed responsible for
numerous human rights violations.67 At least seven officers cited in
the Human Rights Watch Report are graduates of the SOA.'
In 1999, Brigadier General Jaime Ernesto Canal Alban, a
graduate of the SOA, commanded the Third Brigade when it set up
a "paramilitary" group under the name of the "Calima Front.,
69
Both the Calima Front and the Third Brigade were linked to drug
trafficking and the massacres of numerous civilians." Moreover,
the Fourth Brigade headed by General Carlos Ospina Ovalle,
another SOA graduate, has been linked to the El Aro massacre
committed in October 1997. 7' Two other Fourth Brigade soldiers
who were in charge of commanding an ambush to steal ransom
money being delivered for the release of a civilian kidnapped by
guerrillas were both graduates from the SOA.72  One of these
Fourth Brigade soldiers, Major David Hernandez Rojas, has also
been linked to the creation of a death squad called "La Muerte"
(Death).73 Also, Major Jesus Maria Clavijo, who was a graduate of
the SOA, took part in the killings carried out near El Carmen de
Atrato in February 1999, and ordered the soldiers under his
command to dismember corpses with chainsaws in order to foil
identification.74 Clavijo was also implicated by individuals as a
party to a series of murders in Medellin and has been linked to the
disappearance of two noted leaders of "displaced people., 7
5
Finally, Colonel Jorge Plazas Acevedo, another graduate of the
SOA, planned and carried out a series of kidnappings for ransom
and murders as head of the Thirteenth Brigade's intelligence unit.76
3. Guatemala- General Romeo Lucas Garcia was the
Guatemalan dictator from 1978 to 1982, and was also a graduate of
the SOA.' During Garcia's reign, there were 5,000 political
murders and up to 25,000 civilian deaths at the hands of the
Guatemala military.78 Garcia's bloody reign and legacy was aided
67. See Human Rights Watch, The Ties That Bind: Colombia and Military-
Paramilitary Links, at http://www.hrw.org/reports/2000/colombia (last visited Sept.
26, 2000).
68. See id.
69. See id.
70. See id.
71. See id.
72. See Human Rights Watch, supra note 66.
73. See id.
74. See id.
75. See id.
76. See id.
77. See NELSON-PALLMEYER, supra note 11, at 33.
78. See id.
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by another SOA graduate, General Manuel Antonio Callejas y
Callejas, who oversaw the disappearance and assassination of
thousands of political opponents."
Another Guatemalan general and SOA graduate, General
Hector Gramajo, organized military atrocities that resulted in the
death of over 200,000 men, women, and children.' In 1991,
Gramajo was found liable in a United States civil suit for the rape
and torture of Diana Ortiz, a United States Ursuline nun.8 Ortiz
had been abducted, tortured, raped, scarred by more than 100
cigarette burns over her body, lowered into a pit filled with the
mutilated and decomposing bodies of men, women, and children,
and forced to participate in the abuse of fellow prisoners for the
"crime" of teaching Mayan children how to read.82 A United States
District Court ordered Gramajo to pay $47.5 million in damages,
but he ignored the court's order and blamed the cigarette burns on
Ortiz's body as the result of a failed lesbian love affair.83 Even
though Gramajo was linked to more than 200,000 military atrocities
and had participated in the torture of Diana Ortiz, Gramajo was
invited to be the honorable commencement speaker at the SOA
two years after his involvement in Diana Ortiz's torture.'
Finally, Colonel Julio Roberto Alpirez, another SOA
graduate, was linked to the killing of Michael DeVine, an American
innkeeper in Guatemala, and the torture and death of Efrain
Bamaca Velasquez, a Guatemalan rebel leader who was married to
Jennifer Harbury, an American lawyer.8  Furthermore, Colonel
Lima Estrada, another SOA alumnus, was arrested for the 1998
79. See id. at 10. The SOA has a "Hall of Fame," where the photos of some of
the graduates that the School honors hang. Callejas has his photo hanging in this
"Hall of Fame." See id.
80. See SCHOOL OF THE AMERICAS: SCHOOL OF ASSASSINS, supra note 1.
81. See NELSON-PALLMEYER, supra note 11, at 10.
82- See NELSON-PALLMEYER, supra note 11, at 12; Sharon Erickson Nepstad,
School of the Americas Watch, PEACE REVIEW, March 2000, at 67.
83. See NELSON-PALLMEYER, supra note 11, at 15.
84. Sharon Erickson Nepstad, School of the Americas Watch, PEACE REVIEW,
March 2000, at 67.
85. See NELSON-PALLMEYER, supra note 11, at 16. Evidence also shows that
Alpirez was on the CIA's payroll when he attended the SOA in 1989 and
continued to work for the Agency after he returned to Guatemala in 1990. The
CIA had a part in covering up relevant information about the murders committed
by Alpirez in order to protect "sources and methods." Our Man in Guatemala,
WASH. POST, March 26, 1995 at C06. Also, Jennifer Harbury has brought suit
against the CIA officials who participated in the torture of her husband, and
against the State Department and National Security Council for concealing
information about her husband's fate. See Harbury v. Deutch, 233 F.3d 596 (D.C.
Cir. 2000).
[Vol. 19:3
2001] ATROCITIES COMMITTED BY SCHOOL OF AMERICAS ALUMNI 485
assassination of Guatemalan human rights champion, Bishop Juan
Gerardi.86 Gerardi had been beaten to death with a brick days after
he released a human rights report critical of the Guatemalan
Army.87
4. Other Countries-Notorious graduates from the SOA are
not limited solely to El Salvador, Colombia, or Guatemala. In
Honduras, four of the five ranking officers who organized death
squads in the 1980's and nineteen of the ranking officers linked to
death squad Battalion 316, including battalion founder, General
Luis Alonso Discua, are all graduates of the SOA.8 In addition,
General Policarpo Paz Garcia, the corrupt dictator of Honduras
from 1980 to 1982, was also a graduate of the SOA.89
In Peru, the three highest ranking Peruvian officers convicted
in 1994 for murdering nine university students and a professor, and
the Peruvian commander who brought out tanks to obstruct the
investigation of the murders were all graduates.90 During the reign
of the Somosa dictatorship in Nicaragua, over 4,000 National Guard
troops graduated from the SOA, and many of these troops later
became the Contras responsible for the deaths of thousands of
civilians in the 1980's.91 Also, Lopoldo Glatieri, the general in
charge of Argentina's "dirty war," an incident where an estimated
30,000 people disappeared, were tortured, and murdered, was also a
graduate.' Finally, the former dictator of Bolivia, Hugo Banzer,
and General Manuel Noriega, a long-time CIA operative currently
serving forty years in a United States prison for drug trafficking, are
also both graduates from the SOA.93
The large number of human rights violations committed by
soldiers and officers who happened to be former students at the
SOA could be a simple coincidence. Just because the SOA is a
common link between atrocities committed in numerous Latin
American countries does not mean that the SOA has played any
86. See School of the Americas Watch, Congress Closes U.S. Army School of
the Americas, Gives Okay to Open Clone, at http://www.soaw.org/Ieg.html (last
visited Sept. 26, 2000).
87. See id.
88. See SCHOOL OF THE AMERICAS: SCHOOL OF ASSASSINS, supra note 1;
NELSON-PALLMEYER, supra note 11, at 9.
89. See NELSON-PALLMEYER, supra note 11, at 33.
90. See SCHOOL OF THE AMERICAS: SCHOOL OF ASSASSINS, supra note 1.
91. See id.
92. See NELSON-PALLMEYER, supra note 11, at 9.
93. See SCHOOL OF THE AMERICAS: SCHOOL OF ASSASSINS, supra note 1;
NELSON-PALLMEYER, supra note 11, at 9. Hugo Banzer's photo also hangs in the
SOA's "Hall of Fame." See SCHOOL OF THE AMERICAS: SCHOOL OF ASSASSINS,
supra note 1.
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type of a role in these atrocities. However, the truth is that the
SOA curriculum has not only been weak in teaching a respect for
human rights, but has, in fact, encouraged Latin American soldiers
to torture and use other techniques that are considered violations of
international law.
C. Evidence Exists Showing that the SOA Curriculum Includes
Torture and Other Techniques that are Violations of
International Law
In 1996, the 'Pentagon publicly admitted that the training
manuals used at the SOA instructed officers in the art of execution
and torture.94 ThePentagon revealed this horrible fact in 1991 after
the Presidential Intelligence Oversight Board was asked by
President Clinton to investigate allegations about CIA operations
in Guatemala. This investigation followed the torture and rape of
Diana Ortiz and' the killings of Michael Devine and Efrain
Bamaca9 The report developed by the Board noted in a single
paragraph that the SOA had used improper instruction materials in
training Latin American officers from 1982 to 1991.' These
training materials,, which never received proper Department of
Defense review, "appeared to condone (or could have been
interpreted to condone) practices such as executions of guerillas,
extortion, physical abuse, coercion, and false imprisonment."' 7 The
report noted that the Department of Defense "modified the
materials" and directed officials in certain Latin American
countries to retrieve all copies of the originals."
Even though the SOA denies the manuals ever existed, the
Pentagon declassified the Spanish-language manuals allowing
Americans to read "some of the noxious lessons the United States
Army taught to thousands of Latin American military and police
officers at the School of the Americas."" The manuals identified
"religious workers, labor organizers, student groups and others in
94. See NELSON-PALLMEYER, supra note 11, at 32.
95. See James Hodge, Training Manuals Said to Condone Torture, NATIONAL
CATHOLIC REPORTER, July 26, 1996, at 10.
96. See id.
97. NELSON-PALLMEYER, supra note 11, at 51.
98. Hodge, supra note 95, at 10.
99. NELSON-PALLMEYER, supra note 11, at 84-85. According to the
Department of Defense, the original English versions of the manuals, which were
translated to create the Spanish versions of the manuals used by the SOA, no
longer exist. See School of the Americas Watch, School of the Americas Manuals,
at http://www.soaw.org/soam.html (last visited Jan. 9, 2001).
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sympathy with the cause of the poor" as targets and insurgents.
100
The manuals, which are written in a "chilling bureaucratese with
which spooks routinely try to sanitize the unmentionable,"
advocate executions, torture, false arrest, blackmail, censorship,
payment of bounty for murderers, and other forms of physical
abuse against insurgents.' For example, the manual entitled
"Terrorism and the Urban Guerilla" states that one of the duties of
a counterintelligence agent is recommending targets for
"neutralizing," which is a euphemism for elimination or assassin-
ation."° As part of the "Interrogation" manual, military officers
were taught to gag, bind, and blindfold suspects and, "coin-
cidentally," thousands of Latin Americans who were tortured and
murdered during interrogation were gagged, bound, and blind-
folded.1"3 Finally, the "Handling of Sources" manual discussed how
a counterintelligence agent "could cause the arrest or detention of
the employee's [informant's] parents, imprison the employee or
give him a beating as part of the placement plan."'" A former
instructor at the SOA has revealed that
Literally thousands of those manuals were passed out. The
officers who ran the intelligence courses used lesson plans that
included the worse [sic] material contained in the seven
manuals. Now they say that there were only eighteen to twenty
passages in those manuals in clear violation of U.S. law. In fact,
those same passages were at the heart of the intelligence
instruction.' 5
100. Gail Lumet Buckley, Left, Right, and Center, AMERICA, May 9, 1998, at 5.
101. James Kitfield, School for Scandal, NATIONAL JOURNAL, Oct. 5, 1996, at
2144; see also NELSON-PALLMEYER, supra note 11, at 51.
102. See NELSON-PALLMEYER, supra note 11, at 51.
103. See id.
104. Id. at 52.
105. Barbara Jentzsch, School of the Americas Critic, PROGRESSIVE, July 1997,
at 14. A similar manual, entitled "Operaciones Sicologicas en Guerra de guerillas"
(Psychological Operations in Guerilla Warfare), was one of the issues the
International Court of Justice (I.C.J.) had to analyze in Military and Paramilitary
Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27). The manual had described the
proper instances when violence and terror was to be used against certain targets,
including court judges, mesta judges, and police officials. Id. at 66. The I.C.J. held
that the manual encouraged the commission of acts that were illegal under
international law, but did "not find a basis for concluding that any such acts which
may have been committed as imputable to the United States of America as acts of
the United States of America." Id. at 148. As discussed in Part IV, this Comment
does not claim that the acts committed by the SOA graduates are imputable to the
United States, but claims that the United States is directly liable for the atrocities
and torture committed by SOA graduates because of improper training.
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The Pentagon has stated that the inclusion of "objectionable"
material in the training manuals was the result of "mistakes," and
that there was "no deliberate and orchestrated attempt ... to
violate Defense Department or U.S. Army policies."" However,
the Pentagon has not stated how the "mistakes" happened or who
was responsible for them."° In fact, the Pentagon has decided that
there is no need for further investigation to assess individual
responsibility.' On the other hand, the Department of Defense
has stated that the manuals were the work of "misguided junior
officers working from outdated intelligence materials.""'°  The
explanation given by the Department of Defense includes the fact
that the intelligence officers who created the manuals "simply
assumed that U.S. laws against assassination, beatings, and
blackmail applied only to U.S. citizens and thus were not applicable
to the training of foreign military officers."''"
Students at the SOA are not only taught how to torture and
assassinate properly, but they also receive human rights training.
The SOA and its supporters have made it seem as if the present
human rights training has always been part of the school's
curriculum."' However, as admitted by Georgia Congressmen
Sanford Bishop, it was only "as the cold war began to end, [that]
the School of the Americas began to adopt a new curriculum.""1
2
The SOA does not offer a course specifically geared towards
the respect for human rights and international law."3 Instead, all of
the SOA's courses, except the computer literacy course, include a
mandatory four-hour block of human rights instruction." 4 The
average duration of a course at the SOA is seven weeks."5 This
means that trainees at the SOA are receiving only four hours of
human rights training in a seven-week period. However, the
instruction is expanded in some courses."6  For example, the
command and general staff officer courses have three days devoted
106. School of the Americas Watch, Pentagon Investigation Concludes that
Techniques in SOA Manuals were "Mistakes," at http://www.soaw.org/Manuals/ig-
report.html (last visited Sept. 26, 2000).
107. See id.
108. See id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. See NELSON-PALLMEYER, supra note 11, at 25.
112. Id. quoting 140 CONG. REC. 3771 (1994).
113. See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 10, at 10-11.
114. See id. at 13.
115. See id. at 10-11.
116. See id. at 13.
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to human rights that include a discussion of incidents in which Latin
American militaries have been involved."7 Yet, the command and
general staff officer course lasts forty-seven weeks."8 Four hours of
human rights training in a seven week course, or even three days of
human rights training in a forty-seven week course, does not seem
adequate considering the number of human rights abuses that SOA
graduates have been linked to.
The increased inadequacy of human rights training is
evidenced by the facts that the instruction offered is merely
cosmetic and that the students at the school have little respect for
the human rights classes. Charles T. Call, an associate for the
United States hemispheric security policy at the Washington Office
on Latin America, was the first human rights advocate to be invited
to give a guest lecture at the SOA."9 Call stated that the changes
made were
not much more than a facelift.. .Several instructors, I found, are
from countries with appalling human rights records.... Indeed,
much of the training at the school is done by officers from Latin
American militaries which have strongly resisted increased
civilian control and accountability. Yet the Defense
Department invites officers from these militaries to serve as
teachers and role models .... Even more distressing, I found that
the United States continues to invite soldiers accused of gross
human rights violations to the school120
Retired United States Army Major Joseph Blair, a former
instructor at the SOA and a former high-level officer in the CIA
who led the Operation Phoenix program in Vietnam, which
resulted in the deaths of more than 40,000 Vietnamese, agrees with
Call's observation regarding the human rights training at the SOA.
Blair states that the four hour blocks of instruction on human rights
are considered "a bunch of bullshit" and that the human rights
training is treated as a joke by most of the Latin American
121trainees .
When I was there, a general who was an officer in the
dictatorship of General Pinochet of Chile taught about four
hours of human rights. It was a joke for fifty or sixty Latin
American officers to sit in a class and have someone from Chile
117. See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 10, at 13.
118. See id. at 10-11.
119. See NELSON-PALLMEYER, supra note 11, at 25.
120. Id. at 26.
121. Id. at 27.
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preach to them about how they should be concerned about
human rights in their own country.12
Another example of how human rights training has been treated as
a joke is evidenced by one training exercise where soldiers were
supposed to be taught to use restraint when dealing with a priest
and catechists while retaking control of a mock town controlled by
a group of rebels. 3 However, during the exercise the priest and
catechists were either killed or abused seventy-five percent of the
time, and the priest's frequent death was treated as a school-wide
joke.2
Some former instructors and students have publicly denounced
the school and its teachings. . In 1989, Major Joseph Blair retired
from the Army and has now become a vocal opponent of the SOA
and United States foreign military policy.125 Blair became a critic of
the SOA after reading newspaper stories in which the United States
Army and school -officials denied knowing that graduates of the
126SOA were committing murders and atrocities in Latin America.
Blair has confirmed that torture was taught at the school while he
was an instructor.
27
I sat next to Major Victor Thiess who created and taught the
entire course which included seven torture manuals and 382
hours of instruction .... He taught primarily using manuals
which we used during the Vietnam War in our intelligence-
gathering techniques. These techniques included murder,
assassination, torture, extortion, and false imprisonment128
Blair confirms that even though the Carter Administration decided
to stop using the techniques applied during the Vietnam War, the
SOA kept supplying Latin Americans with recommendations to use
techniques and procedures that were clear violations of human
rights and international law.9 Blair observes that "[o]nce you learn
it in the school, you retain it for life."' 3
Former graduates of the school have also spoken out to reveal
the horrors that are taught at the SOA. Jose Valle, a member of
122. Jentzsch, supra note 105, at 14.
123. See NELSON-PALLMEYER, supra note 11, at 27.
124. See id.
125. See Jentzsch, supra note 105, at 14.
126. See Linda Cooper, Former Instructor Says SOA Should Close, NATIONAL
CATHOLIC REPORTER, May 8, 1998, at 7.
127. See Jentzsch, supra note 105, at 14.
128. Nepstad, supra note 84, at 67.
129. See Jentzsch, supra note 105, at 14.
130. Id.
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Battalion 316 and an admitted torturer, stated that while a student
at the SOA he took an intelligence course in which he viewed "a lot
of videos which showed the type of interrogation and torture
[American intelligence officers] used in Vietnam.' '31  Another
former SOA graduate revealed that
The school was always a front for other special operations,
covert operations. They would bring people from the streets [of
Panama City] into the base and the experts would train us on
how to obtain information through torture. We were trained to
torture human beings. They had a medical physician, a U.S.
medical physician which I remember very well, who was dressed
in green fatigues, who would teach the students ... [about] the
nerve endings of the body. He would show them where to
torture, where and where not, where, you wouldn't kill the
individual.'32
The recent addition of human rights training to the SOA
curriculum cannot disguise the past abuses that SOA alumni have
been involved in. Also, it cannot change the fact that the United
States Army and the SOA have played key roles in human rights
abuses and violations of international law by. teaching torture,
assassination, and a disrespect for human rights. The United States
has denied liability for the actions of its graduates,'33 but the tenets
of domestic and international law do not agree that the United
States is not liable for the violations of international law committed
by the alumni of the SOA.
III. Establishing and Maintaining Jurisdiction Against the United
States
Presently, no blueprint exists describing how a victim of an
SOA graduate's atrocity can bring suit against .the United States
because no precedent exists internationally or domestically that has
decided one country's liability for training another country's
military to torture and disrespect human rights.' However, for
131. NELSON-PALLMEYER, supra note 11, at 32.
132. NELSON-PALLMEYER, supra note 11, at 31 quoting INSIDE THE SCHOOL OF
ASSASSINS (Richter Productions 1996).
133. See School of the Americas Watch, Pentagon Investigation Concludes that
Techniques in SOA Manuals were "Mistakes," at http://www.soaw.org/Manuals/ig-
report.html (last visited Sept. 26, 2000).
134. In 1986, Nicaragua brought suit against the United States in the
International Court of Justice (I.C.J.) for events that occurred prior to the fall of
President Anastasio Somoza Debayle in 1979 and after the time when a Junata of
National Reconstruction and an eighteen member government was installed by the
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reasons to be discussed, the most favorable way for a plaintiff to
establish the United States' liability for torture in Latin America
because of improper training at the SOA is to bring suit in a United
States District Court. Assuming that no Americans have been
abused by any SOA graduates, and would therefore not have
standing to bring suit, an alien plaintiff must establish jurisdiction
through a two-prong procedure. First, the alien plaintiff must
establish jurisdiction through the use of the Alien Tort Act and the
Federal Tort Claims Act.
Frente Sandisnista de Liberacion Nacional, the group that led an armed coup
against President Somoza. See Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v.
U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 20 (June 27). Even though the United States first supported
the new government, the United States' opinion of the new Nicaraguan
government changed. The United States began to provide support to the Contras,
a force fighting against the new government that was responsible for "considerable
material damage and widespread loss of life, and [had] also committed such acts as
killing of prisoners, indiscriminate killing of civilians, torture, rape, and
kidnapping." Id. at 21. Support for the Contras came specifically from budgetary
legislation that Congress enacted and the President approved in 1983 with a
"specific provision for funds to be used by United States intelligence agencies for
supporting 'directly or indirectly, military or paramilitary operations in
Nicaragua."' Id. The I.C.J. reasoned that by approving and encouraging the
recruiting, training, arming, equipping, and supplying of the Contras, the United
States "committed a prima facie violation of [the customary international law
principle of the non-use of force] by its assistance to the Contras in Nicaragua, by
'organizing or encouraging the organization of irregular forces or armed bands...
for incursion into the territory of another state,' and 'participating in acts of civil
strife in another State."' Id. at 118. However, the I.C.J. noted that even though
the funding provided to the Contras by the United States constituted intervention
into the internal affairs of Nicaragua, the funding alone did not amount to the use
of force. Id. at 119. Finally, the I.C.J. held, among other things, that the United
States could not justify its actions by claiming collective self defense of El
Salvador, Honduras, or Costa Rica because no armed attack had occurred against
any of these countries nor did they request the United States' help. Military and
Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 119 (June 27).
The Nicaragua case is not determinative of the issue presented in this case for
a number of reasons. First, neither Congress nor the President approved the
teaching of torture to SOA graduates by any written law. In the Nicaragua case,
Congress specifically passed legislation that provided funds for the Contras'
operations and the President subsequently approved this legislation. Second, the
I.C.J. determined the issue in light of the United States justifying its actions on
using the doctrine of collective self-defense. The facts surrounding the atrocities
committed by the SOA graduates do not give the United States any support to
make this argument. Finally, I.C.J. judgments have "no binding force except
between the parties and in respect of that particular case." Statute of the I.C. J.,
art. 59. In other words, I.C.J. judgments are not mandatory precedent and are not
determinative of any case.
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A. The Alien Tort Act
In recent years, more alien plaintiffs have been bringing suit in
United States District Courts for violations of international law,
specifically human rights violations, that have been committed by
individuals, nation states, and international corporations. '35 This
trend has been aided in large part by the Alien Tort Act.1 6 Even
though the controversial Alien Tort Act has a murky past,137 the
first Congress passed the Act to permit alien citizens to bring suit in
Federal District Court for violations of international law or a
United States treaty."' According to the Act, subject matter
jurisdiction can be maintained if three conditions are satisfied: (1)
the plaintiff is an alien; (2) the claim is for a tort; and (3) the tort is
committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the
United States.
In this case, the first condition is easily satisfied. The plaintiffs
who have standing to bring suit against the United States are the
victims of the inhumane acts and atrocities committed by SOA
graduates. Because these atrocities have been committed in Latin
America, one can safely assume that the majority of victims are not
citizens of the United States. In other words, the majority of
plaintiffs who have standing, which are represented by the
hypothetical plaintiff, would be considered aliens.
135. See Elizabeth Amon, Coming to America, NAT'L L.J., Oct. 23, 2000, at Al.
136. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000).
137. Some case law suggests that the Alien Tort Act may have been passed
strictly to target only private, nongovernmental acts that are contrary to a treaty of
the United States or the law of nations, such as piracy and assaults against
ambassadors. See Amon, supra note 135, at Al. See also Sanchez-Espinoza v.
Reagan, 770 F.2d 202, 209 (D.C. Cir. 1985) ("This obscure section of the Judiciary
Act of 1789 [the Alien Tort Act] ... may conceivably have been meant to cover
only private, nongovernmental acts that are contrary to treaty or the law of nations
-the most prominent examples being piracy and assaults upon ambassadors.").
However, this reasoning is not supported by other and more recent case law that
supports the proposition that aliens can sue governmental officials for violations of
international law. See Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232 (2d. Cir. 1995), cert. denied,
518 U.S. 1005 (1996); In re Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, 25 F.3d 1467 (9th Cir.
1994), cert. denied, Estate of Marcos v. Hilao, 513 U.S. 1126 (1995); Filartiga v.
Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
138. Title 28, Section 1350 of the United States Code, entitled "Alien's Action
for Tort," provides:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an
alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a
treaty of the United States.
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In regards to the second condition, torture has been a
recognized tort since Filartiga v. Pena Irala.39 The plaintiffs in
Filartiga were citizens of Paraguay who brought suit in Federal
court against a former police inspector of Paraguay who tortured to
death a member of the plaintiffs' family." The District Court
dismissed the case because torture was not recognized as a violation
of the law of nations in 1789, the year the Alien Tort Act had been
passed."' However, the Appellate Court unanimously acknow-
ledged that although official torture had not been recognized as a
violation of the law of nations in 1789, the universal prohibition had
become a rule of customary law that brought torture within the
language of the Alien Tort Act.'
4 2
Filartiga was a celebrated holding, but one Federal judge,
Judge Bork, questioned whether victims of official torture
committed in foreign nations could bring suit under the Alien Tort
Act absent a grant by Congress of a private right of action.
Congress dealt with Judge Bork's criticism by codifying Filartiga's
holding in the Torture Victim Protection Act.'" In passing the
Torture Victim Protection Act, Congress noted that this Act
enhanced the already available remedy under the Alien Tort Act
by extending the remedy to United States citizens who may be
tortured in a foreign country, and that the Alien Tort Act "should
remain intact to permit suits based on other norms that already
exist or may ripen in the future into rules of customary inter-
national law."'45 With the passage of the Torture Victim Protection
Act, Congress recognized that torture is a tort that falls within the
Alien Tort Act that must be recognized in all jurisdictions.
Therefore, the second condition required under the Alien Tort Act
is also satisfied.
The third condition needed to satisfy subject matter
jurisdiction under the Alien Tort Act requires that the tort be
committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the
United States.'" The Alien Tort Act does not define the term "law
139. 630 F.2d 876 (2d. Cir. 1980).
140. Id. at 878.
141. Id. at 880.
142. Id. at 884-85.
143. See Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 470 U.S. 1003 (1985).
144. See H.R. REP. No. 102-367, at 4 (1991), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 84,
87.
145. Id.
146. Even though the United States is a party to some treaties and conventions
that prohibit torture, as will be discussed later, this Comment restricts itself to
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of nations," but the courts have interpreted the term to mean
"customary international law.'1 4 7  The principles and rules of
customary international law are living and evolving concepts that
exist when nation states follow a general and consistent practice out
of a sense of legal obligation." One of the most important things to
remember is that the law of nations and customary international
law is not merely a doctrine of law that is separate from domestic
law, but is, in fact, an integral part of the Federal common law of
the United States. 49 In order to determine if an act violates
customary international law, evidence must show that the act is
generally recognized as wrong by a large number of nations."' The
best starting point in determining whether the prohibition against
torture is a violation of customary international law is to look at
international treaties and conventions that have been created and
ratified by a large number of nations.
Presently, numerous international treaties and conventions
exist promoting human rights and prohibiting torture. One of the
first treaties to be created and ratified by a large number of nations
was the United Nations Charter. Articles 55 and 56 of the Charter
make it clear that all members of the United Nations should strive
to "promote ... universal respect for, and observance of, human
rights and fundamental freedoms. ,,. . One of the shortcomings
discussing how torture violates customary international law for Alien Tort Act
purposes. The reason for this limitation is one of simplicity. Instead of changing
the hypothetical plaintiff's nationality numerous times to determine if the United
States has violated any treaty with any of the countries in Latin America, an alien
plaintiff can allege a violation of customary international law independent of his
nationality and whether his country is a party to a treaty prohibiting torture along
with the United States.
147. See Beanal v. Freeport-McMoran, Inc., 197 F.3d 161, 165 (5th Cir. 1999).
148. See Ge v. Peng, No. 98-1986, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12711 at *11 (D.D.C.
Aug. 28, 2000); Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 881 (2d. Cir. 1980).
149. See First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Para El Comercio Exterior de Cuba,
462 U.S. 611, 623 (1983) ("[I]nternational law, which, as we have frequently
reiterated 'is part of our law."'); The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900)
("International law is part of our law, and must be ascertained and administered
by the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction, as often as questions of right
depending upon it are duly presented for their determination."); Filartiga v. Pena-
Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 885-88 (2d Cir. 1980) (discussing the integration of the law of
nations into the federal common law and jurisdiction of Article III of the
Constitution).
150. See Beanal, 197 F.3d at 167.
151. U.N. CHARTER, art. 55. Article 55 of the United Nations Charter provides
in relevant part:
With a view to the creation of conditions of stability and well-being which
are necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations . .. the
United Nations shall promote ... universal respect for, and observance
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of the United Nations Charter is that even though it states that
human rights should be respected and promoted, the Charter does
not define what human rights should be protected.'
In order to clear up the ambiguity and shortcomings of Article
55 of the United Nations Charter, the General Assembly of the
United Nations created and passed without dissent the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights. 3 Article 5 of this Declaration
unequivocally states that "[n]o one shall be subjected to torture or
to cruel, inhumane or degrading treatment or punishment."
Scholars and courts have determined that this Declaration has
become part of the body of customary international law since its
creation and passage in 1948.' 55  Along with the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, the General Assembly of the United
Nations also created and passed the Declaration on the Protection
of All Persons Being Subjected to Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. 156 This Declar-
ation, which also passed without dissent, expressly prohibits any
state from permitting acts of torture. 57 Even though the United
States is not a party to either of these Declarations, the Federal
courts view these Declarations as significant in defining customary
international law because "they specify with great precision the
obligations of member nations under the [United Nations] Charter
of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinctions as
to race, sex, language or religion.
Article 56 of the United Nations Charter provides:
All members pledge themselves to take joint and separate action in
cooperation with the Organization for the achievement of the purposes
set forth in Article 55.
Though the United States is a party to the United Nations, the United States
regards Articles 55 and 56 of the United Nations Charter as merely an expression
of certain aspirations and not a self-executing treaty. See Sei Fujii v. California,
242 P.2d 617 (Cal. 1952).
152. The Filitargia court noted in regards to Article 55 of the United Nations
Charter that "[a]lthough there is no universal agreement as to the precise extent of
the 'human rights and fundamental freedoms' guaranteed to all by the Charter,
there is at present no dissent from the view that the guaranties include, at a bare
minimum, the right to be free from torture." Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876,
882 (2d Cir. 1980).
153. G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., Supp. No. 1, at 71, U.N. Doc.
A/810 (1948).
154. Article 5 of G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., Supp. No. 1, at 71,
U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948).
155. See Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 882.
156. G.A. Res. 3452, U.N. GAOR, 30th Sess., Supp. No. 34, at 91, U.N. Doc.
A/1034 (1975). See also Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 240 (2d Cir. 1995), cert.
denied, 518 U.S. 1005 (1996).
157. See id.
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and because of their adoption, 'member nations can no longer
contend that they do not know what human rights they promised in
the Charter to promote.""5 The fact that the United States did not
become a party to these Declarations does not change the United
States' obligations under customary international law to respect
human rights and not to promote torture. However, there are other
United Nations' resolutions and agreements that the United States
has adopted that prohibit torture.
In 1990, the United States Senate ratified the United Nations
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment along with more than 100
other nations.9 This Convention includes provisions aimed at
preventing torture, prosecuting torturers, and compensating victims
of torture." In addition to this Convention, the United States
Senate ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, which also includes provisions that prohibit torture61
Besides torture being prohibited by numerous international
agreements, which supports the proposition that torture is outlawed
by customary international law, the United States judiciary and
other sources have went even further to state that the prohibition
against torture is not only prohibited by customary international
law, but is actually a jus cogens norm.
A jus cogens norm is a peremptory norm of international law
that can never be abrogated by any country.62 The Federal courts
have long recognized the right of a person to be free from torture.
158. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 883.
159. G.A. Res. 39/46, U.N. GAOR, 39th Sess., Supp. No. 51 at 197, U.N. Doc.
A/39/51 (1984) (Entered into force for the United States in November 1994).
160. See id.
161. See Article 7 of G.A. Res. 2200, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16 at
49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966) (Entered into force for the United States in
September 1990).
162. See Cornejo-Barreto v. Seifert, 218 F.3d 1004, 1016 (9th Cir. 2000).
163. See Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 243 (2d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 518
U.S. 1005 (1996) (stating that torture is prohibited by international human rights
and humanitarian norms); Trajano v. Marcos, 978 F.2d 493, 499 (9th Cir. 1992),
cert. denied, Estate of Marcos v. Hilao, 513 U.S. 1126 (1995) (stating that death
from torture is contrary to the law of nations); Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876,
885 (2d Cir. 1980) (stating the right to be free from torture is a "fundamental
right"). In addition to the courts recognizing the prohibition against torture,
Congress passed certain legislation that prohibited the United States from assisting
countries that engage in torture. See Agricultural Trade Development and
Assistance Act of 1954, 7 U.S.C. § 1712 (prohibiting agreements to finance sale of
agricultural commodities to nations that have a consistent pattern of human rights
violations); International Financial Institutions Act of 1977, 22 U.S.C. §§ 262d and
262(1) (prohibiting financial assistance to nations that have a consistent pattern of
human rights violations unless the program serves "the basic human needs" of the
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However, some courts in the United States have determined that
the prohibition against torture is a jus cogens norm.l 64 In addition,
The Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the
United States proclaims that the prohibition against "torture or
other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment" is a
jus cogens norm that cannot be derogated from.165
Looking at all these sources as evidence, it is clear that torture
is prohibited by the law of nations and customary international law
even if torture is not defined as a jus cogens norm. In this case,
however, the United States itself has not tortured any person.
Instead, the United States trained another nation's soldiers to
torture and disrespect human rights. In a factually similar case, a
group of plaintiffs brought suit against President Ronald Reagan,
the Central Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, and
other federal officials for training, directing, authorizing, and
financing the Contras who were responsible for torture and other
degrading treatment of Nicaragua's civilian population.' 66 The court
concluded that the plaintiffs could not obtain judicial relief for the
violations alleged.1 6' Even though the facts of Sanchez-Espinoza
and this case are similar, the court's decision is not determinative as
to whether the victims of SOA torture can bring suit against the
United States for its training of military soldiers because of a few
important distinctions.
First, in Sanchez-Espinoza, the court was faced with judging a
law that had been approved by both the executive and legislative
branches.'9 However, the teaching of torture at the SOA never
received official approval from either the executive or legislative
branches. Also, the Sanchez-Espinoza court incorrectly reasoned
citizens of such a nation); Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, 22 U.S.C. §§ 2151n(a) &
2304 (stating that no foreign assistance would be provided "to the government of
any country which engages in a consistent pattern of gross violations of
internationally recognized human rights, including torture or cruel, inhuman, or
degrading treatment or punishment, prolonged detention without charges, or other
flagrant denial of the right to life, liberty, and the security of person ....").
164. See Cornejo-Barreto v. Seifert, 218 F.3d 1004, 1016 n.15 (9th Cir. 2000);
Hilao v. Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, 103 F.3d 789, 795 (9th Cir. 1996); Comm. of
United States Citizens Living in Nicaragua v. Reagan, 859 F.2d 929, 941 (D.C. Cir.
1988).
165. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 702, comment n (1987).
166. Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, 770 F.2d 202, 205 (D.C. Cir 1985). See also
supra note 133.
167. Id. at 209.
168. See Comm. of the United States Citizens Living in Nicaragua v. Reagan,
859 F.2d 929, 935 (D.C. Cir. 1988); Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v.
U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 20 (June 27).
2001] ATROCITIES COMMITTED BY SCHOOL OF AMERICAS ALUMNI 499
that the Alien Tort Act had been passed solely to cover private,
nongovernmental acts.169 Based on this reasoning, the court
determined that no treaty or principle of customary international
law existed that made the activities alleged by the plaintiffs illegal if
conducted by private, non-state actors. 70  However, as discussed
previously, since the Filartiga holding and its codification by the
Torture Victim Protection Act, the idea that the Alien Tort Act
does not provide subject matter jurisdiction to victims of torture
committed by government officials has been overruled. In addition,
even if the Alien Tort Act applied only to unlawful conduct by
private, non-state actors, courts have held that individuals can
violate international law for torture and other egregious conduct
that violates customary international law. 7'
Because this case can be distinguished from Sanchez-Espinoza
and because the act of conducting torture is prohibited by
customary international law, it is only logical that training military
officials to participate and engage in this notorious conduct is also
prohibited. For jurisdictional purposes, the United States violated
international law by making torture part of the curriculum at the
SOA, and by failing to investigate or take adequate preventive
measure once it had been discovered that a large number of SOA
graduates had been involved in human rights violations.
In sum, an alien plaintiff can establish subject matter
jurisdiction against the United States under the Alien Tort Act
because torture is an actionable tort that violates the law of nations.
However, the United States has sovereign immunity from lawsuits
that can only be waived by an act of Congress. In this case, the
Alien Tort Act does not waive the United States' sovereign
immunity so jurisdiction against the United States must be
maintained through another statute-the Federal Tort Claims
Act.
172
169. Sanchez-Espinoza, 770 F.2d at 206.
170. Id.
171. See Ge v. Peng, No. 98-1986, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12711 at *11-12
(D.D.C. Aug. 28, 2000); Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 239-40 (2d Cir. 1995), cert.
denied, 518 U.S. 1005 (1996).
172. See Koohi v. United States, 976 F.2d 1328 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 508
U.S. 960 (1993) (alien plaintiffs brought suit against the United States under the
Alien Tort Act in conjunction with the Federal Tort Claims Act); Sanchez-
Espinoza v. Reagan, 770 F.2d 202, 207 (D.C. Cir 1985) (stating that the Alien Tort
Act does not waive the United States' sovereign immunity).
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B. The Federal Tort Claims Act
The Federal Tort Claims Act'73 provides a limited waiver of the
United States' sovereign immunity in claims involving money
damages for injuries "caused by the negligent wrongful act or
omission of any employee of the Government while acting within
the scope of his office or employment, under circumstances where
the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the
claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or
omission occurred." '174 Even though the Federal Tort Claims Act
mentions "negligence" within its statutory language, the Federal
Tort Claims Act does not waive immunity solely to tort actions
involving negligence, but "the Act extends to novel and unpre-
cedented forms of liability as well." '175 By its language, the Act
waives the United States' immunity in broad, sweeping terms, but
the language of 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) also contains limitations to this
waiver that must be overcome to maintain jurisdiction over the
United States.
Under the Federal Tort Claims Act, the United States is liable
for the actions of its employees under the respondent superior
doctrine. 176 In other words, the United States can only be held
liable when a master-servant relationship exists between the United
States and the wrongdoer. 17  At first glance, it seems that an alien
plaintiff could not sue the United States for the torture committed
by the SOA graduates because there is no master-servant relation-
ship between the United States and the SOA graduates. However,
as will be explained further in Part IV, an alien plaintiff would not
allege that the United States is vicariously liable for the actual
torture committed by the SOA graduates. Instead, an alien plaintiff
would allege that the United States is directly liable for the teaching
of torture and other improper lessons that violated international
law because the soldiers and instructors at the SOA were "acting
within the scope of [their] employment." '178 Even though the
soldiers and instructors at the SOA were "acting within the scope of
[their] employment," satisfying one portion of the Federal Tort
Claims Act, another restriction must be overcome.
173. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (2000).
174. Id.
175. Holmes Herefords, Inc. v. United States, 753 F. Supp. 901, 910 (D. Wyo.
1990).
176. See Dumansky v. United States, 486 F. Supp. 1078, 1090 (D.N.J. 1980).
177. See id.
178. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (2000).
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The Federal Tort Claims Act, by its language, also limits the
United States' waiver of immunity to only those torts that an
individual can be liable for under state law.9 Normally, inter-
national law applies solely to nation states and international
organizations, but, as noted earlier, individuals can be found liable
for international law violations that are considered notorious and
egregious, such as torture."O Furthermore, it has been noted that a
long recognized principle exists in the United States that customary
international law is part of the Federal common law.'' Because of
the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution," the Federal common
law, including the integration of international law, is the Supreme
Law of the land and is part of state law. In other words, because
international law is integrated into state law through the Supremacy
Clause and individuals can be liable for notorious and egregious
violations of international law, an individual can be held liable
under Georgia state law for committing and teaching torture. With
the help of the Supremacy Clause and Federal common law, the
United States' immunity is still waived under the Federal Tort
Claims Act.
Even though the limitations contained in the text of 28 U.S.C.
§ 1346(b) does not preclude jurisdiction over the United States, a
plaintiff must still overcome the exceptions to the waiver of
immunity codified by Congress in 28 U.S.C. § 2680.'83 If any of the
179. See Reynolds v. Southern Management, Inc., 856 F. Supp. 618, 620-21
(W.D. Okla. 1994); Holmes Herefords, Inc. v. United States, 735 F. Supp. 901, 913
(D. Wyo. 1990); White v. Franklin, 637 F. Supp. 601, 613 (N.D. Miss. 1986);
Dumansky v. United States, 486 F. Supp. 1078, 1087 (D.N.J. 1980).
180. See supra note 171 and accompanying text.
181. See supra note 149 and accompanying text.
182. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl.2. The Supremacy Clause provides:
This Constitution and the Laws of the United States which shall be made
in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made,
under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of
the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any
Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary
notwithstanding.
183. Title 28, Section 2680 of the United States Code, entitled "Exceptions,"
provides:
The provisions of this chapter [28 U.S.C.S. §§ 2671 et seq.] and section
1346(b) of this title shall not apply to-
(a) Any claim based upon an act or omission of an employee of the
Government, exercising due care, in the execution of a statute or
regulation, whether or not such statute or regulation be valid, or based
upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a
discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal agency or an
employee of the Government, whether or not the discretion involved be
abused.
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exceptions contained in this section can be applied, then jurisdiction
over the United States cannot be maintained. In this case, the only
exceptions that may apply are the discretionary function excep-
(b) Any claim arising out of the loss, miscarriage, or negligent transmission
of letters or postal matter.
(c) Any claim arising in respect of the assessment or collection of any tax or
customs duty, or the detention of any goods, merchandise, or other
property by any officer of customs or excise or any other law enforcement
officer, except that the provisions of this chapter [28 U.S.C.S. §§ 2671 et
seq.] and section 1346(b) of this title apply to any claim based on injury or
loss of goods, merchandise, or other property, while in the possession of
any officer of customs or excise or any other law enforcement officer, if -
(1) the property was seized for the purpose of forfeiture under any
provision of Federal law providing for the forfeiture of property
other than as a sentence imposed upon conviction of a criminal
offense;
(2) the interest of the claimant was not forfeited;
(3) the interest of the claimant was not remitted or mitigated (if the
property was subject to forfeiture); and
(4) the claimant was not convicted of a crime for which the interest
of the claimant in the property was subject to forfeiture under a
Federal criminal forfeiture law.
(d) Any claim for which a remedy is provided by sections 741-752, 781-790
of Title 46, relating to claims or suits in admiralty against the United States.
(e) Any claim arising out of any act or omission of the Government in
administering the provisions of sections 1-31 of Title 50, Appendix.
(f) Any claim for damages caused by the imposition or establishment of a
quarantine by the United States.
(g) [Repealed]
(h) Any claim'arising out of assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest,
malicious prosecution, abuse of process, libel, slander, misrepresentation,
deceit, or interference with contract rights: Provided, That, with regard to
acts or omissions of investigative or law enforcement officers of the United
states Government, the provisions of this chapter [28 U.S.C.S. §§ 2671 et
seq.] and section 1346(b) of this title shall apply to any claim arising, on or
after the date of the enactment of this proviso, out of assault, battery, false
imprisonment, false arrest, abuse of process, or malicious prosecution. For
the purposes of this subsection, "investigative or law enforcement officer"
means any officer of the United States who is empowered by law to execute
searches, to seize evidence, or to make arrests for violations of Federal law.
(i) Any claim for damages caused by the fiscal operations of the Treasury or
by the regulation of the monetary system.
(j) Any claim arising out of the combatant activities of the military or naval
forces, or the Coast Guard, during time of war.
(k) Any claim arising in a foreign country.
(1) Any claim arising from the activities of the Tennessee Valley Authority.
(M) Any claim arising from the activities of the Panama Canal Company.
(n) Any claim arising from the activities of a Federal land bank, a Federal
intermediate credit bank, or a bank for co-operatives.
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tion, 8 the combatant activity exception,185 and the foreign country
exception."'
1. The Discretionary Function Exception-Congress imple-
mented the discretionary function exception to the waiver of
immunity in order to maintain the separation of powers between
the political branches of government-the legislative and executive
branches-and the judicial branch.'7 Congress wanted to prevent
the judiciary from second guessing the acts or omissions performed
by the members of the legislative or executive branch that involve
an element of judgment or choice."
The exercise of judgment which the exemption protects must be
one which would otherwise involve courts in making a decision
entrusted to other branches of the government. Decisions
which require a government official to weigh competing policy
alternatives are entitled to immunity for such decisions and are
the ordinary responsibility of the legislative and executive
branches.' 9
In other words, the exception does not permit the judicial
branch to inquire into the action or decisions of the legislative or
executive branches if these actions or decisions involved the
weighing of alternative public policy considerations.'9 However,
the exception does not apply in situations where the act or omission
184. See 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (2000).
185. See 28 U.S.C. § 26800) (2000).
186. See 28 U.S.C. § 2680(k) (2000). Although torture may be considered a
claim that arises out of an assault and battery, the Assault and Battery Exception,
28 U.S.C. § 2680(h), would not be applicable in this case. This exception applies
when a government employee directly commits an assault or battery. See United
States v. Shearer, 473 U.S. 52 (1985) (stating that § 2680(h) covers claims that stem
from a battery committed by a government employee); Lamberston v. United
States, 528 F.2d 441 (N.Y. 1976), cert denied 426 U.S. 921 (stating that federal
courts are without jurisdiction to entertain a suit against the United States based
on assault or battery by government employee); Wood v. United States, 760 F.
Supp. 952 (D. Mass. 1991), affid, 956 F.2d 7 (1st Cir. 1992), cert. denied, Kimbro v.
Velten, 515 U.S. 1145 (1995) (stating that the Federal Tort Claims Act precludes
claim against United States for assault and battery allegedly committed by its
employee). A plaintiff alleging the United States is liable for the torture
committed by SOA graduates because of the SOA curriculum would not be
claiming that the SOA graduates are government employees or that the soldiers of
the United States Army actually committed the torture making § 2680(h)
inapplicable in this case.
187. See Canadian Transport Co. v. United States, 663 F.2d 1081, 1086 (D.C.
Cir. 1980).
188. See Clark v. United States, 805 F. Supp. 84, 87 (D.N.H. 1992).
189. Canadian Transport Co., 663 F.2d at 1087.
190. See Clark, 805 F. Supp. at 87.
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in question did not involve the exercise of choice or judgment. 9'
The clearest example of actions that do not involve choice or
judgment between alternative public policy considerations is when
statutes, regulations, or policies exist prescribing a course of action
to be followed by a governmental employee.
When the Supreme Court first analyzed the discretionary
function exception, the Court created a planning/operational
dichotomy to determine whether an act or decision was
"discretionary."'93 The Court reasoned that decisions occurring at
the "planning" level, such as the creation of laws, were
discretionary while decisions occurring at the "operational" level,
such as the enforcement of laws, were not discretionary. 94 Four
decades later, however, the Court determined that this dichotomy
was not appropriate because there were decisions that arguably
occurred at the "operational" level that could be considered
discretionary.9 In place of the planning/operational dichotomy,
the Court stated that a court should inquire into "the nature of the
actions taken and whether they are susceptible to policy analysis."1 "
The most recent application of this new analysis is found in Vickers
v. United States. 97
In Vickers, the plaintiff's ex-husband, a detention enforcement
officer for the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), had
shot her.9 The plaintiff alleged that the United States government
was liable for her injuries for two reasons. First, the plaintiff
alleged that the INS was negligent in supervising and retaining her
ex-husband as an officer entitled to carry a firearm.'99 The plaintiff
also alleged that the INS failed to investigate a previous shooting
incident involving her ex-husband and his former girlfriend.2" The
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals first noted that the discretionary
function exception had been enacted to prevent the judiciary from
reanalyzing "legislative and administrative decisions grounded in
social, economic, and political policy through the medium of an
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. See Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 42 (1953).
194. See id. at 42.
195. See United States v. Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315, 324 (1991).
196. Id. at 325.
197. 228 F.3d 944 (9th Cir. 2000).
198. Id. at 947.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 947, 948.
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action in tort., 21 The court then explained the two-step analysis
that the Supreme Court created in Gaubert.
The first inquiry is whether the challenged action involved an
element of choice or judgment, for it is clear that the exception
'will not apply when a federal statute, regulation, or policy
specifically prescribes a course of action for an employee to
follow.' .. .If choice or judgment is exercised, the second
inquiry is whether that choice or judgment is of the type
Congress intended to exclude from liability-that is, whether
the choice or judgment was one involving social, economic, or
political policy.2°2
Furthermore, the court clarified that a decision by a government
officer or agency does not have to actually be based on policy
considerations to fall within the discretionary function exception,
but the decision need only be "susceptible to policy analysis.""2 3 In
regards to the plaintiff's first claim, the court stated that decisions
concerning the hiring, training, and supervision of employees fall
within the discretionary function exception.2" Based on this
reasoning and the fact that no evidence existed to show that the
INS violated any mandatory policy or regulations, the court held
that the decision to allow the ex-husband to carry a firearm based
on earlier proficiency testing and the decision not to discharge the
ex-husband were both "susceptible to policy analysis" and were
within the boundaries of the discretionary function exception to the
United States' waiver of immunity. 5
However, in regards to the plaintiff's second claim, the court
held that the INS had a duty to investigate the alleged shooting of
the former girlfriend based on the existence of agency policy that
required both reporting and investigation of such incidents."l The
court reasoned that
[A]lthough INS investigators undoubtedly enjoy discretion in
the conduct of an investigation, this discretion does not extend
to the question of whether to report to superiors or to
investigate at all an allegation of misuse of Service-issued
firearms. The failure to report or to investigate therefore
constituted a failure to follow the mandatory requirements
201. Id. at 949 quoting United States v. Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315, 323 (1991).
202. Vickers, 228 F.3d at 949.
203. Id. at 950-51.
204. Id. at 950.
205. Id. at 951.
206. Id. at 951-52.
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proscribed by agency regulations as implemented by policy
guidelines. Since those regulations and guidelines required
investigation and reporting action in the instant case, the
[Federal Tort Claims Act's] discretionary function exception
does not apply.'O°
For this reason, the court determined that the discretionary
function exception did not bar the plaintiff's suit against the INS or
the United States.~
Applying the two-prong standard to the case against the
United States for the SOA curriculum, one finds that the
discretionary function exception does not bar suit against the
United States. The first prong requires one to determine whether a
federal statute, regulation or policy exists prescribing a course of
action that would then preclude a person from using judgment or
choice. As early as 1866, the Supreme Court recognized that
"[T]here is no law for the government of the citizens, the armies or
the navy of the United States ... which is not contained in or
derived from the Constitution. ''21 In other words, the Constitution
is the source of military law. This being the case, the Supremacy
Clause makes the Constitution the supreme law of the land along
with the Federal common law. Once again, customary international
law, which prohibits torture, is part of the Federal common law and
supreme law of the land. Because the military is controlled by the
Constitution, military regulations and training procedures must not
violate the supreme law of the land or customary international law.
Further support for this claim can be found in Orkilow v.
United States. 210 In Orkilow, the Central Intelligence Agency had
conducted an expansive covert research project to investigate
chemical and biological warfare, and to counter Soviet and Chinese
advances in brainwashing and interrogation techniques.21 Many of
the experiments conducted were performed on unwilling human
subjects. The District Court held that "[w]hen a decision is made
to conduct intelligence operations by methods which are
unconstitutional or egregious, it is lacking in statutory or regulatory
authority. ''2" The court further stated that to determine that the
decision to conduct illegal experiments on unwilling subjects
207. Vickers, 228 F.3d at 953.
208. Id.
209. Ex Parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2, 141 (1866).
210. 682 F. Supp. 77 (D.D.C. 1988).
211. Id. at 79.
212. Id. at 80.
213. Id. at 81.
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involved a policy judgment "would extend the protection of the
exception beyond what Congress intended to protect from judicial
second guessing., 21 1 In the case of the SOA, providing training in
torture methods is egregious and unconstitutional because of the
Supremacy Clause and, therefore, lacks any statutory or regulatory
authority. Furthermore, the Pentagon specifically admitted that the
manuals used as instructional purposes violated Department of
Defense and Army policies. 215 Because the Constitution and policy
regulations existed proscribing a course of action, judgment or
choice could not be exercised in regards to the decision to teach
torture at the SOA making the discretionary function exception
inapplicable.
However, even if one were to assume that a choice or
judgment could be exercised satisfying the first prong, one is hard
pressed to imagine that the teaching of torture is the type of
conduct Congress wanted to exclude from liability. As noted
earlier, the Senate has ratified international agreements that
prohibit torture, and the entire Congress specifically passed
legislation that prohibits the United States from conducting foreign
relations with governments that have a history of torture. It is not
logical for Congress to want to punish foreign governments for
engaging in torture, but allow the United States to teach foreign
militaries how to engage in torture. "To hold that these
discretionary decisions involve a measure of policy judgment would
extend the protection of the exception beyond what Congress
intended to protect from judicial second guessing. ' In sum, the
discretionary function exception does not preclude an alien plaintiff
from suing the United States.
2. The Combatant Activity Exception-Because the
discretionary function exception does not apply in this case, the
government may argue that the training occurring at the SOA falls
within the combatant activity exception to the waiver of sovereign
immunity supplied by the Federal Tort Claims Act. The Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals discussed the combatant activity
exception in Koohi v. United States. 217 The court had to determine if
the shooting down of an Iranian civilian aircraft by a Navy warship
during a conflict with Iranian gunboats was within the combatant
activity exception. 2" The court discussed at length the three
214. Id. at 82.
215. See supra p.18.
216. Orkilow, 682 F. Supp. at 82.
217. 976 F.2d 1328 (9th Cir. 1992).
218. Id. at 1330.
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primary reasons Congress had for creating the combatant activity
exception.
First, tort law is based in part on the theory that the prospect of
liability makes the actor more careful. ... Here, Congress
certainly did not want our military personnel to exercise great
caution at a time when bold and imaginative measures might be
necessary to overcome enemy forces; nor did it want our
soldiers, sailors, or airmen to be concerned about the possibility
of tort liability when making life or death decisions in the midst
of combat. Second, tort law is based in part on a desire to
secure justice-to provide a remedy for the innocent victim of
wrongful conduct.... War produces innumerable innocent
victims of harmful conduct-on all sides. It would make little
sense to single out for special compensation a few of these
persons-usually enemy citizens-on the basis that they have
suffered from the negligence of our military forces rather than
from the overwhelming and pervasive violence which each side
intentionally inflicts on the other. Third, there is a punitive
aspect to tort law.... Society believes tortfeasors should suffer
for their sins. It is unlikely that there are many Americans who
would favor punishing our servicemen for injuring members of
the enemy military or civilian population as a result of actions
taken in order to preserve their own lives and limbs.219
The Court then turned to the language of the statute, and
determined that § 26800) is to be interpreted by its plain meaning
and not technical legalese.22° Using this reasoning, the court first
noted that the phrase "combatant activities" includes "not only
physical violence, but activities both necessary to and in direct
connection with actual hostilities." '221 The court then interpreted the
phrase "time of war., 222 The court reasoned that in the modern era,
the United States has participated in armed conflicts and hostilities
without a formal declaration of war.223 For this reason, the court
concluded that in order for actions to fall within the meaning of
"time of war," as used in the combatant activity exception, the only
thing that is necessary is the existence of a significant armed conflict
and not a formal declaration of war.22 ' For the preceding reasons
219. Id. at 1334-35.
220. Id. at 1333. See also Johnson v. United States, 170 F.2d 767, 769 (9th Cir.
1948).
221. Id. at 1333, n.5 quoting Johnson v. United States, 170 F.2d 767, 770 (9th
Cir. 1948).
222. See Koohi, 976 F.2d at 1334.
223. Id. at 1334.
224. Id.
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and because the executive branch made a deliberate decision to
have the United States military involved in a series of hostile
encounters during the Iraq-Iran war, the court held that the
combatant activity exception banned the plaintiffs' suit against the
United States.225
Applying the reasoning discussed in Koohi to the case of the
SOA, one finds the combatant activity exception does not apply.
First, applying the plain language of the statute, one may argue that
the teaching of torture involves physical violence and would be a
combatant activity. However, any physical violence that may be
involved in the teaching of torture is "not necessary to or in direct
connection with actual hostilities.226  Similarly, because these
activities are not related to any actual hostilities, either declared or
undeclared, there is also no "time of war" within the meaning of the
statute.
Furthermore, looking at the three reasons for the
implementation of the exception none of these reasons exist
allowing the United States to be shielded from liability. First,
unlike the soldiers in combat, the SOA instructors have no need to
use bold or imaginative measures to overcome enemy forces, and,
therefore, should use greater caution when training soldiers. Also,
it is undeniable that war creates innocent victims on both sides of
the conflict that do not receive any special treatment. In the case of
the SOA, however, there is no war and, furthermore, the training
specifically instructs the SOA students to disrespect human rights
and to target the poor, members of the church, and student activists
as "insurgents." This notorious and negligent training focus
produces innocent civilians that are harmed by SOA graduates
trained by the United States, and these innocent victims deserve to
secure justice. Finally, the American public may not favor
punishing servicemen who harm members of an enemy military or
civilian population as a result of protecting their own lives, but it is
more likely that the American conscience would support punishing
soldiers for training foreign soldiers how to conduct international
human rights violations. For all of these reasons, it is clear that the
combatant activity exception to the United States' waiver of
immunity under the Federal Tort Claims Act would not bar a suit
brought by the alien plaintiff.
225. Id. at 1335.
226. Id. at 1333, n.5 quoting Johnson v. United States, 170 F.2d 767, 770 (9th
Cir. 1948).
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3. The Foreign Country Exception-The final statutory
exception to the waiver of sovereign immunity under 28 U.S.C. §
2680 that may arguably apply is the foreign country exception. As
previously mentioned, liability under the Federal Tort Claims Act
is determined "in accordance with the law of the place where the
act or omission occurred," and the foreign country exception is an
extension of this concept. In order to avoid the United States
being held liable under the laws of a foreign country, Congress did
not want the United States' waiver of sovereign immunity to extend
to claims arising in a foreign country.2 When determining whether
the foreign country exception applies, it is important to remember
that the primary factor to consider is where the negligent act or
omission occurred, not where the negligent act or omission had its
operative effect.229
In Sami v. United States, the plaintiff, an Afghanistan citizen,
brought charges against the United States Government, the
International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol), and
individuals in the United States National Central Bureau of the
Department of the Treasury (USNCB) for false arrest and
imprisonment, libel, slander, and deprivation of his constitutional
rights." The plaintiff and his American ex-wife were engaged in a
custody dispute over their two children, and both had secured
custody over the children in different states; the plaintiff had
custody in Maryland and his ex-wife had custody in Florida. 2 At a
time when the children were physically in Florida, the plaintiff
traveled to Florida and transported the children back to Maryland,
even though he knew this action violated Florida law. 33
Immediately following this incident, the ex-wife successfully had
three arrest warrants issued against the plaintiff; two in Florida and
one in Maryland.23 Next, the ex-wife feared that the plaintiff would
leave the country so she contacted the USNCB, the United States'
liaison with Interpol.135 The ex-wife's fears were justified because
the plaintiff did leave the country.236 Numerous messages were sent
227. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (2000).
22& See Meredith v. United States, 330 F.2d 9, 10 (9th Cir. 1964), cert. denied,
379 U.S. 867 (1964).
229. See In re Paris Air Crash, 399 F. Supp. 732, 737 (C.D. Cal. 1975).
230. 617 F.2d 755 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
231. Id. at 758.
232 Id. at 757.
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. Sami, 617 F.2d at 757.
236. Sami, 617 F.2d at 758. The first message from the USNCB stated that a
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to Interpol liaisons by USNCB along the plaintiff's expected route,
and based on these requests German authorities arrested the
plaintiff.237 Soon after, however, the State Department determined
that no extraditable offense was involved. 238 Even though the State
Department relayed this determination to the German authorities
with a request to release the plaintiff, the plaintiff was not released
until four days after his original detention."
In the process of determining whether the United States and its
officials could be held liable for the improper and false detention of
the plaintiff, the Sami court reiterated that the law of the place
where the negligence or wrongful act occurred determines liability
under the Federal Tort Claims Act.2" In other words, under the
Federal Tort Claims Act, the imposition of liability "focuses on the
place of the government employee's act or omission.,
24
'
Additionally, the court reasoned that the foreign country exception
only applies when the "act or omission of any employee of the
government" occurs in a foreign country, and it will not apply if
only the claim arises in a foreign country. 2 The court then focused
on the legislative history of the exception, and determined that the
legislative history of the exception supported the conclusion that
Congress did not intend for the exception to apply if the wrongful
acts, negligence, or omissions occurred in the United States.243
Finally, the court held that the foreign country exception did not
exempt the plaintiff's suit against the United States or its agents.24
Turning now to the SOA, the act of teaching torture
undeniably had its operative effect in Latin America. However, as
discussed in Sami, the foreign country exception will only exempt a
plaintiff's claim against the United States if the wrongful act,
Florida warrant had been issued for the plaintiff, requested that the plaintiff be
arrested, and stated that Florida would extradite the plaintiff. Id. The next
message stated that the United States would extradite instead of Florida, and that
a felony arrest warrant had been issued in Maryland. Id. The chief of the USNCB
later stated that when he said that the United States would extradite he meant that
Florida would request the United States to extradite and that he had no basis for
stating that the Maryland warrant was for a felony. Id.
237. Id. at 758.
238. Id. at 758.
239. Id.
240. Id. at 761.
241. Sami, 617 F.2d at 762.
242. Id. at 762, n.7.
243. Id. at 762. See also Leaf v. United States, 588 F.2d 733 (9th Cir. 1978);
Meredith v. United States, 330 F.2d 9 (9th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 867
(1964); Orlikow v. United States, 682 F. Supp. 77 (D.D.C. 1988); In re Paris Air
Crash, 399 F. Supp. 732 (C.D. Cal. 1975).
244. Id. at 763.
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negligence, or omission occurred in a foreign country, but not if the
operative effect of the wrongful act, negligence, or omission
occurred in a foreign country. In this case the wrongful act -the act
of teaching torture-occurred in the United States. Because only
the operative effect occurred in a foreign country and not the
wrongful act of the United States' agents, the foreign country
exception does not preclude an alien plaintiff's claim against the
United States.
In sum, the Federal Tort Claims Act waives the United States
sovereign immunity allowing an alien plaintiff to maintain
jurisdiction over the United States. Neither the limitations in the
language of the Federal Tort Claims Act nor the statutory
exceptions to the waiver of immunity preclude the plaintiff from
bringing suit against the United States for the act of teaching
torture at the SOA. However, there is one final, judicially created
barrier that must be overcome by an alien plaintiff to maintain
subject matter jurisdiction.
C. Political Question Doctrine
In Baker v. Carr,"5 the United States Supreme Court
determined that, in order to maintain the separation of powers
required by the Constitution, the judicial branch should refrain
from challenging certain policy choices and value judgments that
are reserved to the legislative or executive branches by the
Constitution.246 Even though the Supreme Court restricted the
power of the judiciary to entertain certain political questions, the
Court warned that courts should not apply the political question
doctrine too broadly or discriminately by labeling any question
involving the legislative or executive branch as "political" because
this labeling could effectively exclude proper claims brought by a
plaintiff.247 The Court specifically noted that "the doctrine ... is
one of 'political questions,' not one of 'political cases."' 24s Although
courts are to refrain from second-guessing the political branches of
the government, the Supreme Court noted that the courts still have
a role in cases involving a potential political question. The Court
reasoned that the judiciary has a duty and the power to determine
"whether a matter has in any measure been committed by the
245. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
246. Id. at 210.
247. Id. at 210-11. See also Comm. of United States Citizens Living in
Nicaragua v. Reagan, 859 F.2d 929 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
248. Id. at 217.
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Constitution to another branch of government, or whether the
action of that branch exceeds whatever authority has been
committed."24 9 In order to aid lower courts in ascertaining whether
a political question exists in a particular case, the Court declared
that the determination of a political question depends upon "a
discriminating analysis of the question posed, in terms of the history
of its management by the political branches, of its susceptibility to
judicial handling in the light of its nature and posture in the specific
case, and of the possible consequences of judicial action., 250
Applying the reasoning from Baker v. Carr to the SOA case,
one finds that both the legislative and executive branches exceeded
the power vested in them by the Constitution. Under the
Constitution, Congress has the power to establish and maintain an
Army. However, there is no constitutional basis for allowing the
Legislature to condone or permit the teaching of torture at a
United States military facility. Once again, the Supremacy Clause
of the Constitution makes customary international law part of the
Supreme Law of the land, and Congress cannot violate this
Supreme Law in any manner. Similarly, the President is the
Commander in Chief of the Army and has the power to engage in
foreign relations.252 However, as in the case of Congress, the
President lacks the Constitutional authority to permit or condone
the training of foreign soldiers in torture tactics. The fact that the
teaching of torture is done by the military, an organization
primarily controlled by both the Executive and Legislative
branches, does not restrict a district court from hearing the case
because both the Executive and Legislative branches exceeded
their Constitutional powers.
Support for this conclusion can be found in Committee of
United States Citizens Living in Nicaragua v. Reagan253 and Koohi v.
United States.M In Committee of United States Citizens Living in
Nicaragua, a group of organizations and individuals sought
enforcement of the International Court of Justice's judgment in
Nicaragua v. United States255 by a United States District Court.56 In
249. Id. at 211.
250. Baker, 369 U.S. at 211-12.
251. See U.S. CONST., art. I, sec. 8, cl. 12.
252. See U.S. CONST., art. II, § 2, cls. 1 & 2.
253. 859 F.2d 929 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
254. 976 F.2d 1328 (9th Cir. 1992). See supra notes 217-226 and accompanying
text.
255. Supra note 134.
256. Comm. of United States Citizens Living in Nicaragua v. Reagan, 859 F.2d
929,932 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
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the context of the political question doctrine, the Court of Appeals
for the District of Colombia noted that the Executive branch does
not have unlimited power to conduct foreign relations without
supervision by the Judicial branch."' The court held, for political
question purposes, that the plaintiff's case against the President
could be maintained.258
Furthermore, in Koohi v. United States, the Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals decided that the political question doctrine did not
preclude a court from hearing a case involving a United States
warship during the Iran-Iraq war. The Ninth Circuit noted that the
Supreme Court had often stated that "federal courts are capable of
reviewing military decisions, particularly when those decisions
cause injury to civilians. ' 259 The Ninth Circuit further proclaimed
that military operations that intruded into the civilian sector would
not be shielded from judicial review by merely claiming a military
necessity. 6 Moreover, the court noted that the political question
doctrine would not apply because the plaintiff sought money
257. Id. at 935, quoting Ramirez de Arellano v. Weinberger, 745 F.2d 1500,
1515 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
258. Id. at 935. Importantly, the court later discussed whether international law
violations have domestic legal consequences.
[D]o violations of international law have domestic legal consequences?
The answer largely depends on what form the "violation" takes. Here,
the alleged violation is the law that Congress enacted and that the
President signed, appropriating funds for the Contras. When our
government's two political branches, acting together, contravene an
international legal norm, does this court have any authority to remedy
the violation? The answer is "no" if the type of international obligation
that Congress and the President violate is either a treaty or rule of
customary international law. If, on the other hand, Congress and the
President violate a peremptory norm (or jus cogens), the domestic legal
consequences are unclear.
Id. at 935. The reasoning and discussion in this case does not effect the case
against the SOA and actually leaves the courtroom door open for a case like the
SOA for two reasons. Primarily, as discussed previously and noticed by the
District Court of Appeals for the District of Colombia, the training and supporting
of the Contras was done through a law enacted by Congress and signed by the
President. In the case of the SOA, there has been no official law created by
Congress or approved by the President. Also, as discussed above, the prohibition
against torture may in fact be a jus cogens norm, and the court in Comm. of United
States Citizens Living in Nicaragua v. Reagan actually accepts that the prohibition
against torture is a jus cogens norm. Comm. of United States Citizens Living in
Nicaragua, 859 F.2d at 941. The court never states that the prohibition against
torture as a jus cogens norm does not have any domestic effect, and in fact leaves
the door open for another court to determine this question.
259. Koohi v. United States, 976 F.2d 1328, 1331 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied,
508 U.S. 960 (1993).
260. Id. at 1331-32.
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damages, which are considered a remedy that does not intrude into
the operations of the Executive or Legislative branches.26
In the case of the SOA, the military decisions of the Army,
Legislature, and President are not beyond judicial review. As in
Koohi, the SOA graduates have used their internationally illegal
education to intrude into and harm the civilian population. Plus,
the alien plaintiff in this case is only seeking money damages from
the United States that have been determined as being non-intrusive
into the affairs of either the Executive or Legislative branches.
In sum, both the Legislative and Executive branches have
power to control the actions of the military, but this power is not
absolute or beyond the power of the courts to question especially if
the power is exercised unconstitutionally. Therefore, the political
question doctrine is not controlling in the alien plaintiff's case
against the United States for the SOA's deadly curriculum.
Because jurisdiction can be maintained against the United States in
a district court, the next step is to show liability.
IV. Theory of Liability
The issue of liability against the United States for providing
military training to Latin American soldiers that includes a lack of
respect for human rights and torture methods is a delicate one
because of the lack of precedent. At first it seems as if the United
States cannot be liable at all under the Federal Tort Claims Act
because liability under this Act attaches based on the doctrine of
respondeat superior.262 For this reason, one may argue that the
United States cannot be liable for the actions of the SOA graduates
because the graduates are not employees of the government.
However, one must remember that the alien plaintiff is not alleging
that the actions of the SOA graduates are the primary impetus for
the lawsuit against the United States. Instead, the plaintiff is
claiming that the action of the United States soldiers and other
military personnel teaching and promoting torture is the cause of
action. Furthermore, an alien plaintiff could not claim the United
States is vicariously liable for the injuries and torture committed by
SOA graduates because the United States cannot be held
vicariously liable for the actions of a third party under the Federal
Tort Claims Act.263 Because the United States cannot be held
261. Id. at 1332.
262. See 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b).
263. See Barron v. United States, 654 F.2d 644, 647 (9th Cir. 1981) ("Under the
Federal Tort Claims Act the United States has not waived its sovereign immunity
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vicariously liable for the torture committed by the SOA graduates
and because employees of the United States did not actually
commit torture, the United States must be liable under some other
theory for the injuries inflicted upon the alien plaintiff by the SOA
graduates. The only actions that can be a basis for liability against
the United States is the actual improper training of foreign soldiers
in torture tactics by the United States military.
Title 42 U.S.C. Section 19832" is the key piece of legislation
that is used domestically by plaintiffs alleging a violation of their
constitutional rights by a state or local official, agency or
municipality. Even though a civil plaintiff can use Section 1983 to
sue a municipality for constitutional violations, he finds himself in
the same predicament the alien plaintiff suing the United States for
the curriculum at the SOA finds himself in. A municipality, under
Section 1983, cannot be held vicariously liable on the basis of the
existence of an employer-employee relationship nor can it be held
liable under a theory of respondeat superior."' Instead, a
municipality can only be held liable under Section 1983 when the
municipality itself causes the constitutional violation." In other
with respect to claims based on vicarious liability."); Gibson v. United States, 567
F.2d 1237, 1243 (3rd Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 925 (1978) (stating that
United States cannot be held vicarious liable for injuries to independent
contractors solely on basis that the United States retained control over the work);
Hall v. United States Gen. Servs. Admin., 825 F. Supp. 427, 432 (D.N.H. 1993)
(stating that liability under the Federal Tort Claims Act cannot be premised on a
theory of vicarious liability); DiSalvatore v. United States, 456 F. Supp. 1079, 1081
(E.D. Pa. 1978) ("In determining whether the [United States] can be liable for the
negligence of an employee under the Federal Tort Claims Act, we must determine
whether any claim would lie against it under the law of the state where the
allegedly tortuous act or omission occurred ... with the limitation that vicarious
liability cannot attach for the acts of persons who are not United State
employees.").
264. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia,
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United State or
other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in any action at law, suit in equity, or
other proper proceeding for redress.... For the purposes of this section,
any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia
shall be considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia.
265. See Brd. of the County Comm'rs of Bryan County v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397
(1997); Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115 (1992); City of Canton v.
Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989); Monell v. New York City Dept. of Soc. Servs. of the
City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
266. See Monell v. Dept. of Soc. Servs. of the City of New York, 436 U.S. 658
(1978).
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words, the municipality can only be liable when it directly causes
the harm.
Many of the cases that have emerged finding a municipality
directly liable under Section 1983 for a violation of a person's
constitutional rights have concerned improper or deficient training
of police officers or other city employees.267 Although in the case
concerning the SOA, a municipality is not the key player, the facts
at issue in municipality liability cases under Section 1983 are
extremely analogous to the SOA and the United States. For this
reason, the jurisprudence interpreting Section 1983 provides
adequate and compelling reasoning for holding the United States
directly liable for the torture inflicted by the SOA graduates
because of the improper, illegal, and deficient training program
offered at the SOA.268
One of the first cases dealing with municipal liability on the
basis of improper training of municipal employees was Canton v.
Harris.69 In Canton, police officials had ignored the plaintiff's
obvious need for medical care while she was in their custody.70 The
plaintiff alleged that the omissions of the police officers violated her
due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.271 At the
subsequent trial, the plaintiff presented evidence showing that the
shift commanders had the sole discretion to determine whether a
person in police custody needed to receive medical attention, but
the evidence further demonstrated that the shift commanders
received no special training to help them make these
determinations.72  The Supreme Court, relying on its earlier
decision in Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Servs.,273
267. See Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115 (1992) (concerning
deficient training of sanitation department employees); City of Canton v. Harris,
489 U.S. 378 (1989) (concerning deficient training of police officers in determining
the need for medical care of detainees) Depew v. City of St. Marys, 787 F.2d 1496
(11th Cir. 1986) (concerning improper training of police officers).
268. Many attorneys and scholars may be surprised to see jurisprudence and
rationale concerning 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a domestic statute used to remedy civil
rights violations, being used to establish legal liability against the United States for
international violations. However, the use of § 1983 jurisprudence in international
law by United States courts is not unprecedented. When Congress passed the
Torture Victim Protection Act, Congress instructed courts to interpret the phrase
"color of law," as used in the Torture Victim Protection Act, by employing § 1983
jurisprudence. See H.R. REP. No. 102-367, at 5 (1991), reprinted in 1992
U.S.C.C.A.N. 84, 87.
269. 489 U.S. 378 (1989).
270. Id. at 381.
271. Id.
272 Id. at 381-82.
273. 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
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proclaimed that when a governmental policy or custom is executed
and causes a constitutional violation and injury to an individual, the
municipality itself can be held liable for the injury under Section
1983.7 For a plaintiff to maintain a claim of liability against a
municipality for the constitutional violation, the Court determined
that the plaintiff needed to show the existence of a direct causal link
between the municipal policy or custom and the constitutional
violation.275
Turning to the plaintiff's case, the Court reasoned that, on its
face, the city's medical treatment policy for persons in police
custody was constitutional.2 76 The Court further reasoned, however,
that this policy can be regarded as unconstitutional if it is applied in
an unconstitutional manner because of the city inadequately
training its police officials.277 In addition, the Court noted that not
all deficient training programs could serve as a basis for Section
1983 liability against a municipality. Instead, the Court declared
that the failure to train could only be a basis for liability "where the
failure to train amounts to [a] deliberate indifference to the rights
of persons with whom the police come into contact" and can be
considered a municipal "policy or custom" actionable under Section
1983.7 The Court further reasoned that "'[m]unicipal liability
under [Section] 1983 attaches where-and only where-a
deliberate choice to follow a course of action is made from among
various alternatives' by city policymakers. ',279  In other words,
liability against a municipality can only attach where the failure to
train reflects a "deliberate" or "conscious" choice by a
municipality.211° The Court clarified the seemingly absurd notion of
a municipality creating a policy of improper training.
It may seem contrary to common sense to assert that a
municipality will actually have a policy of not taking reasonable
steps to train its employees, but it may happen that in light of
the duties assigned to specific officers or employees the need for
more or different training is so obvious, and the inadequacy so
likely to result in the violation of constitutional rights, that the
policymakers of the city can reasonably be said to have been
274. Canton, 489 U.S. at 385.
275. Id.
276. Id. at 388.
277. Id.
278. Id. at 389.
279. Canton, 489 U.S. at 389 quoting Pembaur v. Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 483-
84 (1986).
280. Id. at 389.
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deliberately indifferent to the need. In that event, the failure to
provide proper training may fairly be said to represent a policy
for which the city is responsible, and for which the city may be
held liable if it actually causes the injury.28'
Finally, the Court held that liability would only attach if the
municipality's training program is closely related to the ultimate
injury and the plaintiff could prove that the deficiency in the
training program caused her injury.282
The Supreme Court reiterated their holding in Canton of
municipal liability almost a decade later in Board of the County
Comm'rs of Bryan County v. Brown. 3 The plaintiff in Brown had
been severely injured when a police officer pulled her from her
vehicle using an "arm bar" technique and threw her to the
ground.2" The plaintiff alleged that the county was liable for her
injuries because the county sheriff had hired the officer that injured
her without properly reviewing the officer's background to discover
a variety of misdemeanor offenses.285  Even though the Court
ultimately held that the County could not be held liable for the
plaintiffs injuries because of an isolated hiring decision, the Court
did discuss the requirements of establishing municipal liability.26
The Court once again reasoned that a plaintiff must demonstrate
that the municipality was the "moving force" behind the
constitutional injury alleged by establishing some direct casual link
between a municipal policy and the constitutional injury.287 The
Court determined that this requirement ensured that the
municipality would only be liable for constitutional violations that
result from the decisions and actions of its "duly constituted
legislative body or of those officials whose acts may be said to be
those of the municipality." 28 Once again, the Court noted that a
plaintiff who claimed that a facially constitutional and lawful
municipal action led to the violation of a plaintiff's constitutional
right had to show that the municipal action had been taken with
281. Id. at 390.
282. Id. at 391.
283. 520 U.S. 397 (1997).
284. Id. at 400-01.
285. Id. at 401.
286. Id. at 416.
287. Id. at 404. See also Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 120
(1992) ("[P]roper analysis requires us to separate two different issues when a §
1983 claim is asserted against a municipality: (1) whether plaintiff's harm was
caused by a constitutional violation, and (2) if so, whether the city is responsible
for that violation.").
288. Brown, 520 U.S. at 403-04.
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"deliberate indifference" to its apparent or reasonably apparent
consequences. 9 Finally, the Court also discussed the proving of
fault and causation in inadequate training cases.
Existence of a [deficient training] program makes proof of fault
and causation at least possible in an inadequate training case. If
a program does not prevent constitutional violations, municipal
decision makers may eventually be put on notice that a new
program is called for. Their continued adherence to an
approach that they know or should know has failed to prevent
tortuous conduct by employees may establish the conscious
disregard for the consequences of their action-the "deliberate
indifference" necessary to trigger municipal liability.29°
Although in the case brought by the hypothetical alien
plaintiff, Section 1983 cannot be directly applied, the facts at issue
in municipal liability cases are extremely analogous to the SOA and
the United States. In the hypothetical plaintiff's case, instead of a
municipality training police officers improperly that results in an
individual's constitutional rights being violated, the plaintiff has the
United States government training foreign soldiers improperly that
results in an individual's human rights being violated. Applying the
reasoning from Canton and Brown, one finds that the United States
is directly liable for the torture inflicted by the SOA graduates.
The hypothetical alien plaintiff must first establish a direct
causal link between the United States policy of training foreign
soldiers improperly and the human rights violations inflicted upon
the plaintiff. In addition, the alien plaintiff must show that the
United States, through its policymakers and officials, deliberately
or consciously chose to implement a course of action that amounted
to a deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with whom the
SOA graduates would reasonably come into contact with."'
289. Id. at 407.
290. Id.
291. When arguing the existence of a direct causal link between a deficient
training program and a constitutional violation in municipal liability cases under
Section 1983, the question that must be answered is whether the injury would still
have occurred if the training program lacked the deficient component. See Canton
v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 391 (1989). While discussing this issue in Canton, the
Supreme Court stated:
Predicting how a hypothetically well-trained officer would have
acted under the circumstances may not be an easy task for the
factfinder, particularly since matters of judgment may be involved,
and since officers who are well trained are not free from error and
perhaps might react very much like the untrained officer in similar
circumstances. But judge and jury, doing their respective jobs, will
be adequate to the task.
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Turning first to the causal link, the evidence 292 demonstrates a
direct link between the torture committed by the SOA graduates
and the SOA intstruction. 293 The best evidence of a link between
the curriculum and the human rights violations are the manuals
used as part of the SOA curriculum. The manuals specifically
advocate the use of torture, executions, false arrest, and numerous
other forms of physical and psychological abuse-a fact that has
been admitted by the Department of Defense and the Pentagon. In
fact, former instructors have also admitted that some of the courses
at the SOA, especially the intelligence courses, focused primarily
on the worst and most horrific material contained in the manuals.
Besides condoning and instructing a student in the proper art of
torture, execution, extortion, coercion, and physical abuse, the
manuals specifically list targets that should be considered as
insurgents and that should be eliminated. This list includes
religious leaders, labor activists, student activists, and other
individuals who sympathize with the poor. It is an extremely
unlikely coincidence that foreign soldiers who had been instructed
using these manuals subsequently commit torture upon individuals
in Latin America. The coincidence seems even more unlikely when
one considers that the victims of torture and murder at the hands of
SOA graduates had been restrained, abused, and killed in the same
manner as described in the manuals. Furthermore, the majority of
these victims are exactly the type of people that the manuals
described as insurgents, including Archbishop Oscar Romero,
Jesuit priests, nuns, union leaders, and poverty stricken peasants.
The obvious conclusion from these unlikely coincidences is that the
Id. Because the Supreme Court trusted judges and juries to determine the
existence of a causal link in § 1983 cases, the same trust of judges and juries should
be afforded in this case. An alien plaintiff should be allowed to present all his
evidence to the factfinder and allow it to determine whether the causal link
between the SOA curriculum and the torture committed. The same factfinder
should be allowed to determine whether the government evidenced a deliberate
indifference towards the rights of people who SOA graduates may come in contact
with.
292. The evidence used throughout this analysis has been thoroughly discussed
in Part II.
293. In Canton, the Supreme Court noted that liability could not attach against
a municipality because of a single officer's lack of training because the officer's
shortcomings may be the result of other factors. Canton, 489 U.S. at 390-91. In
this case, the hypothetical plaintiff would not be claiming that liability would
attach against the United States for the shortcomings of one foreign soldier. As
discussed above in Part 1I of this Comment, the evidence shows that numerous
SOA graduates have been extensively involved in human rights abuses.
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SOA graduates were enacting the instructions discussed in the
manuals.
Further evidence of a direct causal link also exists by the lack
of human rights training. Besides the fact that the amount of time a
student at the SOA spends learning about human rights as
compared to the amount of time that same student spends learning
about combat and intelligence techniques is minimal, instructors at
the SOA have exposed that the human rights training at the SOA is
inadequate. Charles T. Call noted that the instruction at the school
towards human rights is merely cosmetic and ineffective because
the instructors teaching the human rights instruction are foreign
soldiers who have already developed a horrific human rights record.
Retired United States Army Major Joseph Blair has agreed with
Call's assessment of the program, and further revealed that the
soldiers treated the human rights training as a joke, which is
evidenced from the school wide joke concerning the frequent death
of the priest during a school training exercise. This inadequate
training of soldiers to respect the rights of people that they come in
contact with supports the notion that the training offered by the
SOA caused the torture inflicted by the SOA graduates. By
allowing foreign instructors who already have extensive and
infamous human rights records to teach courses on respect and
recognition of human rights creates an image that the training is not
to be taken seriously.
Finally, the revelations of the former instructors and students
of the SOA also support a direct causal link. Major Blair has
publicly admitted that torture had been taught at the school while
he was an instructor there and that the instruction at the school had
been based on techniques used by the United States military during
the Vietnam War. Former students have also revealed that
demonstrations on how to properly commit torture had been given
by American soldiers who actually tortured people for these
demonstrations. It is hard to argue that these non-simulated
demonstrations had been presented to the students at the SOA to
show what the students were not supposed to do. Instead, the only
reason for giving live demonstrations of torture is to show students
exactly how and what they were suppose to do to people who were
"insurgents." Based on all the evidence concerning the manuals,
the inadequate human rights training, and the actual instruction in
torture, one can obviously see the direct casual link between the
instruction and the human rights violations committed by the SOA
graduates.
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Besides demonstrating a direct causal link between the human
rights violations and the SOA curriculum, the plaintiff needs to
demonstrate that the United States government, through its
officials and officers, consciously acted with deliberate indifference.
Once again the manuals themselves are the best evidence of this
requirement. The manuals specifically discuss how to violate a
person's human rights through torture and murder. These horrible
and noxious lessons are in violation of international law if
committed against combatant enemies, but the notoriousness of the
lessons is increased by the fact that the manuals identify members
of the civilian population as insurgents and enemies that need to be
"neutralized." The fact that the United States military deliberately
chose to use these manuals at the SOA evidences that the United
States acted with deliberate indifference to the human rights of
both combatant and civilian persons that the SOA graduates would
come in contact with.
Another example of deliberate indifference by the United
States government is the fact that the Department of Defense and
the Pentagon refused to change the curriculum after evidence had
been gathered demonstrating that a large number of SOA
graduates were involved in human rights violations. It is true that
the Department of Defense claimed that it modified the material in
1996 and asked some Latin American officials not to use the
materials. Yet, the Department of Defense had known since, at
least, the early 1980's during the El Salvador civil war that SOA
graduates had been involved in human rights abuses. However, the
Department of Defense and the Pentagon refused to investigate
and determine whether changes had to be made to the program. In
fact, instead of investigating the allegations of SOA graduates being
involved in human rights abuses, the Department of Defense and
Pentagon honored some of these same graduates by inviting them
back to the SOA to be instructors or speakers or by placing their
pictures in the "Hall of Fame" at the SOA. Assuming that the
Department of Defense did not know by the early 1980s of the
violations, the extensive evidence demonstrates that long before
1996 the Department of Defense had reason to be put on notice
that a new program was called for. Even if no deliberate attempt
had been made to violate United States military policy, as claimed
by the Pentagon and the Department of Defense, the deliberate
choice to adhere to a program that failed to prevent human rights
violations establishes the -conscious disregard and deliberate
indifference to the consequences of their actions.
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Even though all the above mentioned evidence reflects a
conscious choice of the United States government to be
deliberately indifferent to the human rights of the citizens of Latin
America and a causal link between the curriculum and human
rights violations by the SOA graduates, one may argue that liability
against the United States is lacking because the Congress, the
Department of Defense, nor the President never officially approved
the infamous curriculum at the SOA. However, turning once again
to the jurisprudence under Section 1983, a plaintiff alleging that a
municipality caused his constitutional rights to be violated does not
have to show that the municipality officially sanctioned a certain
practice through a properly created law or policy. Instead, a
plaintiff can establish municipal liability by showing a persistent
practice of misconduct that was allowed to continue without the
municipality ceasing the practice. By the municipality allowing the
practice to continue without interruption or correction, a custom
that has the force of law can be created and result in a municipality
being liable for any constitutional violations that may occur from
that practice.
In Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co.,29' a white school teacher,
Adickes, had been refused service in a Mississippi restaurant when
she was accompanied by six of her black students 9 The restaurant
owner claimed that he was justified in not serving Adickes because
he did want a riot to ensue due to his serving a white woman
accompanied by a group of blacks.2 96 Subsequently to not being
served, Adickes decided to leave the restaurant, and she was then
immediately arrested by the police. Adickes alleged that her equal
protection rights were violated under Section 1983 because the
refusal to serve her was due to a state-enforced custom requiring
segregation in local restaurants. 97 If Adickes could prove a state-
enforced custom of segregation in restaurants, the Supreme Court
had to determine if the custom had to have the force of law for
Section 1983 purposes. 8 The Court first discussed that the phrase
"under color of law" evidenced that Congress had created Section
1983 to punish only action that had been supported by the State.2
Because Section 1983 was enacted only to punish actions and
conduct approved by the State, the Court reasoned that a custom or
294. 398 U.S. 144 (1970).
295. Id. at 146.
296. Id. at 154, n. 10.
297. Id. at 148.
298. Id. at 148-49.
299. Adickes, 398 U.S. at 163, 166.
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usage had to have "the force of law by virtue of the persistent
practices of state officials" for Section 1983 purposes.' The Court
then discussed that Congress included customs in Section 1983
because Congress knew that discriminatory practices still existed in
different states throughout the country."0 The Court reasoned that
the discriminatory practices by state officials could become so
widespread and permanent that they could become a "'custom or
usage' with the force of law" even though the practices had not
been authorized by any written law.3° The Court stated that "[i]t
would be a narrow conception of jurisprudence to confine the
notion of 'laws' to what is found written on the statute books and to
disregard the gloss which life has written upon it. Settled state
practice... can establish what is state law." °3  Based on this
reasoning, the Court remanded the case back to the district court
for a new trial to determine if a custom of racial segregation in
restaurants actually existed .
In Depew v. City of St. Marys,3 °5 the plaintiffs, Depew and
Fowler, were mechanics who had been test driving a jeep that had
just been repaired when they were pulled over by Officer Kusek
after Fowler had allowed the jeep to veer to the right two times to
check the steering."° Even though Kusek did not detect any alcohol
on Fowler's breath, Kusek made Fowler take a sobriety test.'
While Kusek went to get the equipment from his patrol car, Fowler
sat down in the jeep to wait.3 8 When Kusek returned to the jeep,
Kusek attempted to force Fowler out of the jeep by grabbing
Fowler around the neck, but, because he was afraid, Fowler held on
to the steering wheel of the car.39 Fowler was soon thrown to the
ground and beaten before he was handcuffed while Depew was
held at gunpoint and handcuffed by other officers that had arrived
300. Id. at 167.
301. Id. at 167.
302. Id. at 167-68. See also Bd. of the County Comm'rs of Bryan County v.
Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 404 (1997) ("Similarly, an act performed pursuant to a
'custom' that has not been formally approved by an appropriate decisionmaker
may fairly be subject a municipality to liability on the theory that the relevant
practice is so widespread as to have the force of law.").
303. Id. at 168 quoting Nashville, C. & St. L.R. Co. v. Browning, 310 U.S. 362,
369 (1940).
304. Adickes, 398 U.S. at 175.
305. 787 F.2d 1496 (11th Cir. 1986).
306. Id. at 1497.
307. Id.
308. Id.
309. Id.
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on the scene.3 '0 Fowler and Depew filed suit against the mayor and
the city council for the violation of their civil rights alleging that the
use of excessive and unreasonable force used by Kusek and the
other officers had been part of an established policy and custom of
police misconduct."' Plaintiffs presented evidence at trail that
showed there had been numerous complaints of police misconduct
filed, and that there was a lack of training, supervision, and
discipline.3" The evidence further demonstrated that both the
mayor and city council were aware of the widespread practice but
neither the mayor nor city council admitted that a problem
existed.313
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals noted that municipal
liability can only be maintained under Section 1983 if a plaintiff can
establish that the city itself caused the plaintiff's deprivation of civil
rights."' The court noted that to establish a custom or policy a
plaintiff needs to show a persistent and widespread practice that
violates constitutional rights, and that the municipality had actual
or constructive knowledge of such practice.315  The court then
determined, based on the evidence presented at trial, that the city
had actual knowledge of the improper police conduct, but failed to
take any remedial action to rectify the constitutional violations by
members of the police force.316 The court held that "[t]he continued
failure of the city to prevent known constitutional violations by its
police force is precisely the type of informed policy or custom that
is actionable under [Section] 1983."37
As with determining municipal liability, it would be a narrow
conception of the law and policy to limit international liability to
only practices established by a nation's laws. The fact that neither
the Legislative nor Executive branches approved the SOA
curriculum does not change the liability against the United States as
discussed above. The evidence shows that the SOA engaged in an
extensive and long-term practice of teaching torture to the students
that attended the SOA, and that SOA graduates had been
implementing these lessons on a widespread scale. The practice of
teaching torture became such a permanent component of the SOA
310. Depew, 787 F.2d at 1497.
311. Id.
312. Id. at 1498.
313. Id.
314. Id. at 1499.
315. Depew, 787 F.2d at 1499.
316. Id.
317. Id.
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that it became a custom with the force of law. Furthermore, as
discussed earlier, the Pentagon and the Department of Defense had
knowledge that the training of torture had been taking place at the
SOA and that numerous graduates of the SOA were involved in
human rights abuses, but failed to take any remedial action.
Furthermore, as will be discussed briefly below, Congress also knew
about the curriculum at the SOA and the effects this curriculum
was having in the Latin American region, but also failed to correct
the problem by closing the SOA or by changing the curriculum.
Because both the Legislative and Executive branches had been put
on notice that the training program at the SOA was deficient
through the improper conduct of the SOA graduates and both had
failed to take any remedial measures to rectify the human rights
violations committed by the students at the SOA, the United States
government created exactly the type of custom that liability evolves
from.
In sum, even though there is no precedent supporting or
refuting international liability against the United States for the
torture and other human rights violations committed by the SOA
graduates, jurisprudence concerning civil rights under the
Constitution supports the conclusion that the United States is liable
for the torture committed. The evidence supports that the United
States, through officials in both the Legislative and Executive
branches, consciously chose to continue the practice of teaching
students the "proper" art of torture, murder, assassination,
coercion, and execution at the SOA instead of changing the
curriculum to eliminate these noxious lessons after the government
learned that the SOA graduates had been involved in human rights
violations. Moreover, the continuation of these lessons and
manuals at the school evidenced a deliberate indifference to human
rights by the United States government, and the fact that the
United States never officially approved this instruction does not
preclude liability against the United States. Through the SOA, the
United States government is unequivocally responsible and liable
for the torture, murders, assassinations, and executions of the Latin
American citizens who had the unfortunate luck of meeting
members of the SOA alumni.
V. Conclusion
For years, the closing down of the SOA has been debated in
both houses of Congress. Numerous bills and proposals have been
presented by a variety of legislators asking their fellow Congress-
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men to shut down the "relic of the cold war." '318 Unfortunately,
none of these bills calling for the closure of the SOA ever passed
the Legislature.
However, in October 2000, President Clinton signed the
Defense Authorization Bill for 2001.' As part of this bill, the
authority granted to the Secretary of the Army to operate the SOA
under 10 U.S.C. § 441520 has been repealed.321 This section of the
Defense Authorization Bill in effect closes down the SOA.
Considering the evidence gathered demonstrating the effects the
SOA has had on the people of Latin America, the repealing of 10
U.S.C. § 4415 would seem like a victory for human rights advocates.
However, the training institution known as the "School of the
Americas" may have been "shut down" as of January 17, 2001, but
the same law that has required the closing of the SOA has provided
authorization to open a new military training facility for Latin
American soldiers.
The new facility authorized by the Defense Authorization Bill
will be known as the "Western Hemisphere Institute for Security
Cooperation. 3 22 This new facility will have the same mission as the
SOA, and will be located at the same location as the SOA.3 2 The
similarities between the SOA and the Western Hemisphere
Institute for Security Cooperation are not limited solely to the
mission and location of the institutions. In fact, the School of the
Americas Watch, a SOA watchdog, has compared the prior
curriculum and structure of the SOA with the new institution.324
Besides a slight change in the person authorized to run the school,
there is no attempt to change the curriculum of the Western
Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation by providing either
quantitatively or qualitatively more human rights training than the
SOA, and no attempt to critically assess the new institution through
sources independent of the United States military, a problem that
318. 145 CONG. REC. S4132 (1999) (statement of Sen. Durbin). See also S. 873,
106th Cong. (1999); H.R. 732, 106th Cong. (1999).
319. See Departments of Defense and Energy-Appropriations, Pub. L. No.
106-398, 114 Stat. 1654 (2000).
320. See supra note 29.
321. See Departments of Defense and Energy-Appropriations, Pub. L. No.
106-398, § 911(b), 114 Stat. 1654, 1654A-559 (2000).
322. See id.
323. See School of the Americas Watch, Congress Closes US. Army School of
the Americas, Gives Okay to Open Clone, at http://www.soaw.org/leg.html (last
visited Sept. 26, 2000).
324. See id.
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also existed under the SOA.325 In other words, instead of the
United States government trying to seriously change the legacy and
notorious curriculum of the SOA, the United States government
decided to restrict its efforts to simply changing the name of the
institution.
Even though the name has changed, an alien plaintiff from El
Salvador, Guatemala, Colombia, or any other Latin American
country who has been victimized at the hands of an SOA graduate
can effectively bring a case against the United States in a Federal
District Court under the Alien Tort Act and the Federal Tort
Claims Act. As hard as the United States may argue, jurisdiction
can and should be maintained over the United States because no
exceptions to the United States' waiver of sovereign immunity
apply. Once in court, an alien plaintiff can turn to jurisprudence
concerning 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for help in proving liability against the
United States for the torture and human rights violations it
promoted through its deficient training program. Even if the
closing down of the SOA is a valid attempt to seriously change the
manner in which the United States trains foreign soldiers, this
change does not affect the liability of the United States for the
torture committed by the SOA graduates. A murderer cannot
escape his responsibility and justice by simply changing his name
and promising not to murder again. The United States has blood
on its hands and should no longer be permitted to escape its liability
and responsibility for the human rights abuses committed by SOA
graduates, like the El Mozote massacre, by hiding in the shadows.
Only when the light of truth and justice shines into the dark corners
of death and suffering accompanying torture and other human
rights violations to reveal the United States' role, will the terrified
screams of the men, women, and children plagued by the legacy of
the SOA finally be silenced.
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